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TOTAL EQUITABLE INDEMNITY: CAN IT PIERCE A
PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law doctrine of indemnity allows shifting of loss from
one legally responsible party to another when certain relationships exist
between co-tortfeasors.1 As with other forms of allocation of loss,2 the
goal of indemnity is to provide a fair allocation of the ultimate burden of
a tort recovery among those legally responsible. Unlike the other doc-
trines of allocation, however, the indemnity doctrine evolved in a hap-
hazard manner and courts, in applying the doctrine, developed
inconsistent criteria and standards. As a result, varying judicial formulas
emerged, along with a lack of certainty about when a particular formula
would operate or why the loss should be shifted.'
Historically, the doctrine was applied in those situations where
courts deemed it the most equitable alternative to the harsh rule prevent-
ing contribution among tortfeasors.4 Liability for damages was shifted
100% from the less culpable tortfeasor to the more culpable,' or from
one whose liability derived solely from his legal relationship with a
tortfeasor who was the proximate cause of the injury.6 In the latter in-
stance, the tortfeasor whose liability arose as a result of a legal relation-
ship with the wrongdoer, not as a result of any active participation in the
wrongdoing, was said to be vicariously or derivatively liable. This too
1. Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383
(1960).
2. Examples of other forms of loss allocation are contribution where co-tortfeasors share
the loss on a pro rata basis and comparative fault, where losses are distributed among
tortfeasors according to their percentages of fault.
3. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886, 73 Cal. Rptr.
660, 664 (1968). Attempts to classify conduct of the indemnitor as "active" or "primary" and
to characterize the conduct of the indemnitee as "passive" or "secondary" "lack[ ] the objec-
tive criteria desirable for predictability in the law." Id. For a discussion of the inconsistent
application of such labels, see infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
4. Alisal, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 75, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 383. See generally Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 140, 146-58 (1932). See infra notes 54-
62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contribution doctrine.
5. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964). In Wiener, a commercial airliner collided mid-air with a military training jet.
Both United Airlines and the government were found to be negligent. However, the party that
was less at fault (United) was granted total indemnification from the government. Id. at 402.
6. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 428, 296
P.2d 801, 804 (1956) (employer held liable under respondeat superior).
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was a total shifting of financial responsibility from one tortfeasor to
another.
In California, the supreme court first articulated partial or compara-
tive indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors in American Motorcycle As-
sociation v. Superior Court.7 Employing the doctrine of joint and several
liability, the court imposed upon each multiple tortfeasor total responsi-
bility for the entire amount of a judgment.' According to the indemnity
rule set forth in American Motorcycle, concurrent tortfeasors can seek
from each other partial indemnification on a comparative fault basis,
sharing the responsibility for the damages according to their respective
percentages of fault.9 However, subsequent to American Motorcycle,
7. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
8. Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The policy underlying joint and
several liability stresses full compensation to a victim. Therefore, all joint tortfeasors are not
only collectively liable for the total judgment, but each tortfeasor is also individually liable for
the whole. Thus, if tortfeasor A is judgment proof (without assets or means to pay), the entire
burden for the total judgment falls upon tortfeasor B, regardless of his degree of fault. See
infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text for further discussion of joint and several liability.
The doctrine of joint and several liability in California was severely modified by The Fair
Responsibility Act of 1986 ("Proposition 51"), approved by California's voters on June 3, 1986.
Proposition 51 amended section 1431 and added sections 1431.1-1431.5 to the California Civil
Code pertaining to joint or several obligations. See 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (West). Now, joint
and several liability is only applicable to economic damages (objectively verifiable monetary
losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of
repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and
loss of business or employment opportunities). However, liability for non-economic damages
is several only. Non-economic damages means subjective, non-monetary losses, e.g., pain, suf-
fering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation. Thus, while a tortfeasor remains
jointly and severally liable for economic damages, he is now liable for only the amount of non-
economic damages ascribed to his share of allocable fault.
For example, assume joint tortfeasors A and B are allocated 60% and 40%, respectively,
of the fault in a personal injury action. Assume medical expenses (economic damages) are
$20,000 and pain and suffering (non-economic damages) are valued at $100,000. AssumeA is
insolvent. Under the pre-Proposition 51 doctrine of joint and several liability, defendants A
and B would be individually and collectively liable for the entire award of $120,000. IfA was
insolvent, then B would be liable for the entire $120,000, less any amount contributed by A.
However, after the passage of Proposition 51, A and B are individually and collectively respon-
sible only for the economic damages of $20,000. As to the non-economic damages of $100,000,
A and B are only individually liable for the amount which represents their percentage share of
allocable fault. Accordingly, A who is 60% negligent is liable for only $60,000 of the non-
economic damages and B who is 40% negligent is liable for only $40,000 of the non-economic
damages. If A is insolvent, B is not responsible for A ' portion of the non-economic damages.
Thus, assuming A is insolvent and cannot pay any part of the judgment, B is liable for only
$60,000, which represents 100% of the economic damages ($20,000) and 40% of the non-
economic damages ($40,000). Unless the plaintiff can recover from A sometime in the future,
the plaintiff will never collect the balance ($60,000) of the non-economic damages.
9. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185. For
example, assume a plaintiff obtains a $100,000 judgment in damages against defendant A who
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concurrent tortfeasors have been statutorily barred from seeking partial
indemnification from a tortfeasor who enters into a pretrial, good faith
settlement with the plaintiff.10 As a result, a defendant who settles for
considerably less than his comparative allocation of fault is free from
cross-claims for partial indemnification by a nonsettling defendant who
must bear the burden of paying the balance of the judgment.
The rule set forth in American Motorcycle was codified by the Cali-
fornia Legislature in Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 which states
that good faith settlements preclude cross-complaints for "partial or
comparative indemnity."11 Thus, a tortfeasor who has been adjudged
only partially at fault cannot seek any kind of indemnification from a
tortfeasor settling in good faith. The statutory language is unclear, how-
ever, and leaves open the question of whether a nonsettling tortfeasor
who is only vicariously liable is similarly barred from seeking total in-
demnification from a settling tortfeasor. California courts disagree when
addressing this issue. Their confusion stems not only from the ambigu-
ous language in American Motorcycle, but also from the nebulous defini-
tion of the indemnity doctrine and its equally imprecise application.12
This Comment discusses this conflict and concludes that, despite the lan-
guage of section 877.6, total indemnification survives in a situation where
the nonsettling tortfeasor is only vicariously liable.
was found to be 20% negligent, defendant B who was found to be 50% negligent and defend-
ant C who was determined to be 30% negligent. Each defendant is liable for 100% of the
judgment but, as to each other, they can cross-complain for indemnification for any amount in
excess of their respective percentages of responsibility. Thus, if defendant A pays the judg-
ment, he is entitled to seek partial indemnity from defendants B and C up to the limits of their
percentages of fault, to wit: $50,000 from defendant B and $30,000 from defendant C.
Even though defendant A is the less culpable party, he is entitled to partial indemnifica-
tion from the other parties only to the extent of their comparative fault allocation. Such a
system differs from total indemnification wherein defendant A can shift the total burden to B
and/or C.
10. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986). In response to American Motorcy-
cle, the California Legislature in 1980 enacted Civil Procedure Code § 877.6, which specifically
codified the American Motorcycle dicta regarding the effects of a pretrial "good faith" settle-
ment between the plaintiff and a tortfeasor. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578
P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Section 877.6(c) provides that a "good faith" settlement
between a plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor shall bar the other joint tortfeasors from "any further
claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or com-
parative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1986).
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1986).
12. See infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various applica-
tions of the indemnity doctrine.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALLOCATION OF FAULT
Allocation of fault involves the determination of the extent of culpa-
bility of all tortfeasors and the plaintiff. How much the tortfeasor pays of
the total damages assessed is based on the extent of his fault.
An historical perspective of the evolving standards for allocation of
fault in California is necessary to confront the more specific issue of
whether total indemnity remains a viable remedy against a defendant
who has made a pretrial settlement. This section will review those stan-
dards, from the early punitive doctrine preventing contribution and the
ameliorating doctrine of total indemnity, through the doctrines of pro
rata contribution, comparative negligence and comparative (partial)
indemnity.
A. Definitions of Indemnity
Various forms of indemnity exist and these must be distinguished.
Moreover, some forms of indemnity have been labelled differently by var-
ious jurisdictions and even among different courts in the same jurisdic-
tion. 3 An overview of the various types of indemnity and their labels is
provided below for clarity and to establish consistent terminology.
Generally, indemnity evolved as a common law doctrine. It is the
right of a tortfeasor, who has been forced to pay a common liability, to
compel another tortfeasor to compensate him for the entire amount he
has paid. 4 Historically indemnity did not involve a sharing of loss
among tortfeasors. Instead, it was a mechanism employed by courts for
shifting the total loss from one tortfeasor to another.I5 The right to in-
demnification may arise from an express contract between tortfeasors
16
13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
14. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628, 532 P.2d 97,100, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 452 (1975) ("[i]ndemnity may be defined as the obligation resting on one party to
make good a loss or damage another party has incurred").
15. Indemnity is essentially a judicially created doctrine. Conversely, the right of contri-
bution is primarily a statutory creature which provides for a pro rata sharing of a common
liability among tortfeasors. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the contribution doctrine.
16. California recognized express contractual indemnity in 1872 when the legislature en-
acted Civil Code § 2772. "Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save another from
a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties, or of some other person." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2772 (West 1974). Express contractual indemnity results when one party expressly
promises to indemnify another for future damages. The most common forms of contractual
indemnification are liability insurance policies and exculpatory clauses. The extent of the in-
demnitor's obligation is determined solely from the contract provisions without reference to
the separate doctrine of implied (equitable) indemnity. Herman Christensen & Sons v. Paris
Plastering Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 237, 132 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976). California courts have consist-
ently required that such contractual provisions be specific in their terms. Rossmoor Sanitation,
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or may be a right specifically provided by statute. 17 Additionally, it can
also be implied in either contractual or noncontractual settings. 8
Implied contractual indemnity 9 arises where a promise to indem-
nify can be inferred from an existing contract.2 ° Although the basis of
the right is contractual, equitable considerations are also necessarily in-
volved. For example, if an indemnitee is found to have been actively
negligent, or somehow participated in the wrongdoing, recovery will be
barred despite the indemnitor's breach of an implied agreement.21
Implied non-contractual indemnity22 arises in tort where there is no
contractual basis for permitting indemnity, but equitable principles re-
quire a shifting of loss. A common example of such indemnity occurs
when an employer, held vicariously liable for his employee's negligence,
obtains full indemnification from the employee.23 This Comment will
refer to such indemnity as total indemnity or total equitable indemnity.
Partial or comparative indemnity is a more recent development in
the indemnity doctrine. This concept allows one tortfeasor to recover
13 Cal. 3d at 628, 532 P.2d at 100, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 452 ("general" indemnity clause con-
strued to provide indemnity for loss resulting from indemnitee's "passive" negligence, but not
construed as encompassing indemnitee's "active" negligence without specific language to that
effect); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377, 379, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 73, 75 (1964) ("although the cases [hold] that one may provide by agreement for indem-
nification against his own negligence .... the agreement for indemnification must be clear and
explicit; the agreement must be strictly construed against the indemnitee"). Such provisions
will be enforced, giving effect to the intent of the parties, so long as that intent is not contrary
to public policy. Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
17. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 17153 (West 1971) (where automobile owner is held lia-
ble for injury caused by driver of owner's car, owner is permitted to recover from driver total
amount of judgment owner was required to pay).
18. See Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 305
(1962).
19. An implied indemnity cause of action can lie in contract or in tort. See Davis, Indem-
nity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REv. 517, 537-38
(1952).
20. See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal.
App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). In San Francisco Unified, the school district, which had
been held liable for injuries to defendant's employee which occurred while he was washing
windows at the school, sought indemnity from the maintenance company. The court held that
the window washing contract carried an implied agreement to indemnify the school district for
injuries resulting from a breach of the agreement. Id. at 448-49, 328 P.2d at 794.
21. See Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 671-76, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 399, 424-27 (1978); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 309 (1962).
22. Implied noncontractual indemnity has been referred to as common law indemnity,
implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, total indemnity, and total equitable indemnity.
23. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d
801 (1956) (employer entitled to recoup loss from employee arising out of judgment against
employer for unauthorized negligent act of employee).
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from a co-tortfeasor a portion of what he has paid to the plaintiff.
24
Thus, he is seeking partial, not total, indemnification. The amount that
the indemnitee is entitled to obtain from the indemnitor cannot exceed
the indemnitor's percentage of fault (or comparative negligence) as deter-
mined relative to the other tortfeasor's fault and any fault imputed to the
plaintiff. Thus, partial indemnity is also called comparative indemnity.
This Comment will refer to such indemnity as partial indemnity or par-
tial equitable indemnity.
B. The Indemnity Doctrine
In early English and American common law there was no right of
contribution or indemnification among co-tortfeasors. 25 All tortfeasors
were liable for an injured person's total damages, and a plaintiff's release
of one tortfeasor constituted a release of all others.26 The tortfeasor who
settled with the plaintiff or who paid the judgment could not seek contri-
bution from other tortfeasors regardless of the disparity in fault. Neither
could the paying tortfeasor implead for contribution another party not
sued by the plaintiff.2 7 The purpose of this policy was punitive in nature
and presumably deterred wrongdoing by not allowing a tortfeasor to
profit from his wrongful actions.28
American courts retained these early prohibitions, but developed ex-
ceptions which permitted a tortfeasor to recover a loss from a co-
tortfeasor or implead a party under certain circumstances. Recovery was
allowed under the doctrine of equitable indemnity.29 Because courts pro-
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 885, 73 Cal. Rptr.
660, 663 (1968) (citing Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.
1799); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App.
2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958)). See also Leflar, supra note 4, at 130-33.
26. See Leflar, supra note 4, at 130-33.
27. Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490, 503-04
(1969). See also infra note 60.
28. Leflar, supra note 4, at 131-32.
29. In its early stages, equitable indemnity was generally confined to vicarious liability
situations. Oldham & Maynard, Indemnity and Contribution Between Strictly Liable and Neg-
ligent Defendants, 28 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 139, 139-40 (1978).
Vicarious or derivative liability presupposes a special or legal relationship between the
parties, e.g., principal/agent, master/servant, employer/employee, manufacturer/retailer, au-
tomobile owner/driver.
The expansion of equitable indemnity into other areas was influenced by the need to ame-
liorate the harsh effects of the inflexible rules prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors. This
objective led the law of indemnity into the generally obscure areas of active and passive negli-
gence, acts of omission and commission, primary and secondary wrongdoers and ultimately
into esoteric evaluations of degrees of fault of tortfeasors. These rationalizations evolved from
the quest to shift total responsibility for wrongs to those who were most culpable. These often
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hibited contribution, indemnity emerged as an all or nothing doctrine.
Under such standards, a co-defendant was totally indemnified by the de-
fendant whose conduct was deemed more blameworthy. Equitable prin-
ciples of restitution and the prevention of unjust enrichment were
applied3" and courts found either equitable grounds for shifting 100% of
the loss, or the loss was not shifted at all.3
Indemnity in American jurisdictions evolved into three broad cate-
gories: situations involving liability by operation of law, situations where
there was negligible fault, and situations where one tortfeasor was less at
fault than any other co-tortfeasor.32
1. Liability by operation of law
A person who, absent any fault on his part, is held liable solely by
operation of law, is entitled to indemnification from the actor who caused
the injury.33 Such liability is labeled vicarious or derivative. For exam-
ple, an employer is held liable for the acts of his employee under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The employer is entitled to total indem-
nification from the employee, assuming the employer did not participate
strained efforts to mold equitable indemnity into a mechanism for adjusting the equities among
joint tortfeasors obscured the doctrine's traditional focus and generated considerable confusion
among judges and attorneys. See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
30. Leflar, supra note 4, at 134.
31. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the areas into which indemnity
expanded:
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors
(1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of
them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the other if the
other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability.
(2) Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the follow-
ing:
(a) The indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the indemni-
tor;
(b) The indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indemnitor and reason-
ably believed the directions to be lawful;
(c) The indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation on the part of
the indemnitor, upon which he justifiably relied;
(d) The indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective work
upon land or buildings as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and
the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect;
(e) The indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a re-
sult of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or
negligently failed to discover the defect;
(f) The indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to protect him against
the liability to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1979).
32. Comment, supra note 27, at 494.
33. Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 269, 272, 78 Cal. Rptr. 279,
282 (1969).
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in the wrong.34
2. Liability where there is negligible fault
This category includes defendants found liable despite their negligi-
ble fault. Generally, these situations involve a failure to discover or rem-
edy a dangerous condition created by another. The person seeking
indemnity has been held liable for the "nondelegable" duty toward the
person injured, even though it would have been practically impossible for
him to have inspected thoroughly enough to have removed the danger
created by the indemnitor's action. For example, in City & County of
San Francisco v. Ho Sing,35 a municipality was held liable to the plaintiff
for a hazardous condition existing on city streets. The court based its
holding on the municipality's nondelegable duty to maintain safe streets.
But the city was permitted indemnification against a private citizen who
created the hazard.3 6
3. Liability with lesser fault
The third situation arose where two or more tortfeasors each partici-
pated in the wrong. Although each was at fault, the less culpable
tortfeasor could seek full indemnification from those who were more neg-
ligent. Under this rule, one who was clearly at fault could shift the entire
burden of liability by locating someone even more culpable. This form of
indemnity was generally acknowledged in jurisdictions which barred any
form of contribution, and arose to ameliorate that inflexible doctrine.37
34. Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956)
(employer vicariously liable for tort of servant). See also Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co.,
6 Cal. App. 2d 256, 44 P.2d 430 (1935) (owner of automobile held vicariously liable for con-
duct of driver).
35. 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
36. City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 138, 330 P.2d 802, 808-09 (1958).
Ho Sing was the first California case to recognize a non-contractual right to indemnity among
tortfeasors. In that case a pedestrian received a judgment against the City of San Francisco for
injuries received when she fell over a defective skylight in a sidewalk abutting the property of
the landowner who owned the skylight. Id. at 128-29, 330 P.2d at 802-03. See also Cobb v.
Southern Pac. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 929, 59 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1967) (employer liable for failure
to discover dangerous condition; granted indemnity from person who created dangerous work-
ing condition leading to employee's injury); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 269 F. Supp. 151
(N.D. Cal. 1967) (owner/occupier liable for failure to provide safe premises granted indemnity
from creator of hazard).
37. Comment, supra note 27, at 497; see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
379, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) ("In order to effect equity and justice
in certain circumstances the rule [barring contribution or indemnity] has been relaxed to per-
mit exceptions .... ").
California courts rejected indemnity in situations where a culpable tortfeasor sought in-
demnification based on a difference in degree of actual fault. Kerr Chems., Inc. v. Crown Cork
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4. Lack of consistent standards
California courts have used various methodologies to determine
whether equitable indemnity was permissible between tortfeasors.3 s In-
demnity analysis has been couched in terms of active versus passive neg-
ligence, primary versus secondary liability, or a combination of both
concepts.3 9 The definitions of these tests have been vague and the appli-
cation of the individual tests by courts has been inconsistent.'
a. active-passive test
The active-passive negligence test purported to distinguish actual
degrees of fault or proximate causation. Courts focused on degrees of
fault, allowing the party with less culpability (the "passive" party) to be
indemnified by the person held to be more negligent (the "active"
party).4" Often, such a test produced inequitable results.42 The net effect
was that courts contrasted degrees of fault to determine who should bear
the total burden. The result allowed a tortfeasor substantially at fault to
be relieved of any liability by pointing to a more culpable tortfeasor.43
& Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 99 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1971). Since the doctrines of implied
contractual and noncontractual indemnity arose in California in 1958, the same year as the
contribution statutes, it has been argued that California courts did not permit such indemnity
where parties shared some degree of fault because contribution was already available. Com-
ment, supra note 27, at 497, 505. However, applying arbitrary labels to degrees of negligence
without consistent standards (e.g., active versus passive, primary versus secondary) resulted in
California courts permitting total indemnity in some circumstances between culpable parties.
See ihtfra text accompanying note 52 and note 158 and accompanying text.
38. This was true whether the courts were considering a legal relationship between the
parties which was created by statute or operation of law; whether they were considering the
extent of a tortfeasor's actual participation in the wrong; or whether they were comparing
degrees of fault of obviously negligent parties.
39. Indemnity was granted when the indemnitee's negligence was "passive" as compared
to the indemnitor's "active" negligence. Alternatively, if the liability of one defendant was
deemed "secondary", he was entitled to indemnity from the party found "primarily"
responsible.
40. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 728,
738 (1968). See also supra note 3.
41. See, e.g., Banks v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 224 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.
1955) (active/passive test essentially a question of comparative negligence of the two actors to
be decided by a jury); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951) (where court
stated in dictum that "[t]he temptation is strong if the faults differ greatly in gravity, to throw
the whole loss upon the more guilty of the two.")
42. See, e.g., Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933) (garage owner held
"actively" negligent for having dim lights in his garage, while person who drove his car into a
ladder in the dimly-lit garage was "passively" negligent).
43. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
951 (1964) ("In view of... the clear disparity of culpability.., there is such difference in the
contrasted character of fault as to warrant indemnity in favor of United ...."). Id. at 402.
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California courts purportedly rejected such balancing in implied non-
contractual indemnity and chose instead the primary-secondary
approach.44
b. primary-secondary test
In the area of implied noncontractual indemnity, California courts
followed the primary-secondary liability standard, relying on the Penn-
sylvania case of Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe.45 Under this approach, a
secondary tortfeasor is liable solely by means of his legal relationship
with the primary tortfeasor, the one who committed the wrong. The sec-
ondary tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from the primary tortfeasor.46
44. California courts generally rejected the practice of balancing and comparing degrees of
fault through the use of the active-passive dichotomy in cases of implied non-contractual in-
demnity. Cahill Bros. v, Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 381-82, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 309
(1962). The Cahill court stated that:
[In the area of implied indemnity one who] personally participates in an affirmative
act of negligence, or is physically connected with an act or omission by knowledge or
acquiescence in it on his part, or fails to perform some duty in connection with the
omission which he may have undertaken by virtue of his agreement [cannot obtain
indemnification].
Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
However, the courts gave limited application to the active-passive balancing approach in
cases involving implied contractual indemnity. Thus, a court would consider the negligent
participation of the person claiming implied contractual indemnity and then decide whether he
was barred from recovery because of his active participation in causing the damage. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 671-75, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399,
424-27 (1978) (general contractor's and employer's negligence passive thus affording them in-
demnification from actively negligent subcontractor); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp.,
62 Cal. 2d 40, 44-45, 396 P.2d 377, 379-80, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75-76 (1964) (general contractor
not permitted indemnification from subcontractor for damages sustained by subcontractor's
employee because general contractor's negligence was active, not passive).
In other jurisdictions, the active-passive test had been used literally to find a right to non-
contractual indemnity between co-tortfeasors by comparing degrees of fault. See supra notes
41-43 and accompanying text.
45. 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
46. The following language from McCabe has frequently been quoted by California courts
when applying the primary-secondary test:
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and the secon-
dary liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by the law to an
injured party. It is a right which inures to a person who, without active fault on his
own part, has been compelled, by reason of some legal obligation, to pay damages
occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which he himself is only
secondarily liable. The difference between primary and secondary liability is not
based on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negli-
gence,-a doctrine which, indeed, is not recognized by the common law. [citation
omitted] It depends on a difference in the character or kind of the wrongs which cause
the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each of the wrongdoers to
the injured person....
... But the important point to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as
distinguished from primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive
only, being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from some
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California's allowance of equitable indemnity in non-contractual sit-
uations was not based on a "lesser degree of fault" analysis. Rather, the
secondary tortfeasor's right to indemnity was established by: (1) examin-
ing the character of his conduct in order to establish whether his liability
was derivative; (2) examining the legal relationship between him and the
defendant through whose conduct he was being held liable; and (3) deter-
mining whether the one claiming indemnity participated in some manner
in the conduct or omission which caused the injury.4' Relying on this
primary-secondary analysis, courts have allowed indemnification of a
party whose duty to the victim stemmed from a legal relationship be-
tween the tortfeasors, 48 a rule of law,49 or some negligible conduct."
California courts, however, often went a step beyond these parame-
ters. First, they permitted indemnity even where a special or legal rela-
tionship between the tortfeasors was absent.51 Second, although framing
positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure to discover or correct
a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of the one primarily
responsible.
Id. at 325-28, 77 A.2d at 370-71 (emphasis added). See, eg., Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J.
Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696-97, 697 n.1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702, 703-04, 704 n.1 (1972);
Muth v. Urricelqui, 251 Cal. App. 2d 901, 908-09, 60 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170 (1967). See also
Cahill Bros., 208 Cal. App. 2d at 381-82, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (issue related to implied contrac-
tual indemnity but court acknowledged the McCabe rule as controlling in implied noncontrac-
tual indemnity).
47. See, e.g., Muth, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 911-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72 (general contractor
held to secondary liability for failure to supervise worksite because there was no duty to super-
vise; therefore general contractor entitled to indemnity from subcontractor whose primary
negligence arose out of its duty to supervise); Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 268, 23
Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1962) (employer not entitled to indemnity from employee for damages
paid to third party because employer failed in its duty to supervise its employee in the cutting
and felling of trees, which made the employer's fault primary, not secondary).
48. See Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420, 97 P. 875 (1908) (respondeat superior); Gard-
ner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975) (real estate broker had cause of
action for indemnity against seller arising out of broker's reliance on seller's misrepresentations
to broker).
49. See City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958) (city held to
have a nondelegable duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks).
50. See Cobb v. Southern Pac. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 929, 59 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1967) (failure
to discover or correct a dangerous condition absent a duty to discover or correct).
51. See, e.g., Cobb, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 932-33, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 918. In Cobb, a railroad
employee sued his employer and also sued a third party who had left a flatcar in an unsafe
condition, causing injuries to Cobb. The employer's failure to discover or correct a dangerous
condition resulted in only secondary liability. The employer was entitled to seek indemnity
from the unrelated third party who had left the flatcar in an unsafe condition. Id. at 933, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 918. See also Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490,
493 (1964). In Herrero, all defendants, a motorist, a hospital and several doctors, were held
liable for concurrent negligence. The motorist was entitled to indemnity from the doctors and
the hospital to the extent of the amount of damages arising out of the separate negligence of
the doctors and the hospital. Id. at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
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their reasoning in terms of active versus passive or primary versus secon-
dary standards, in many situations courts recognized indemnity on the
basis of the disparity in the degree of fault. 2 This result conflicted with
the California courts' general reluctance to use the indemnity doctrine to
relieve a culpable party of liability.
The demarcation between the application of the active-passive test
and the application of the primary-secondary test superficially seems ex-
plicit. The active-passive test is concerned with degrees of culpability.
Courts label the more culpable party actively negligent and the less cul-
pable party passively negligent. The primary-secondary test is concerned
with whether there is solely vicarious liability. Courts hold the tortfeasor
proximately causing the wrong primarily liable while the tortfeasor
whose liability is derivative is held secondarily liable. The two tests are
distinct. Yet courts often used the labels interchangeably and applied
them inconsistently, producing inequitable results. The tests emerged as
mere conclusions, not offering guidance in determining whether indem-
nity should or should not be granted."
C. Contribution
Total equitable indemnity and contribution are doctrines differing in
52. See infra note 158 and accompanying text for an example of this application of the
indemnity doctrine.
53. Muth v. Urricelqui, 251 Cal. App. 2d 901, 60 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1967). In Mlth, a gen-
eral contractor obtained indemnification from his subcontractor who had improperly graded a
lot, even though the general contractor was itself negligent in failing to supervise the grading,
The court labeled the general contractor's conduct "passive" and that of the subcontractor
"active" and thus the general contractor was granted total indemnification by the subcontrac-
tor. Id. at 909-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 170-72. As one commentator noted, the general contrac-
tor's conduct could have been termed either "active" negligence in staying away from the site,
or as "passive" negligence in failing to go to the site and inspect. On the other hand, did the
subcontractor either passively fail to grade in the proper manner, or actively grade in an im-
proper manner? See Comment, supra note 40, at 738.
The language used in some cases suggests that the California courts lumped the various
tests for indemnity together. See, e.g., Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 604, 610, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701, 705 (1967) ("plant owner's omission was secondary and
passive, while the contractor's was immediate and active"); San Francisco Examiner Div.,
Hearst Publishing Co. v. Sweat, 248 Cal. App. 2d 493, 497, 56 Cal. Rptr. 711, 714 (1967)
(equitable indemnity "involves the equitable considerations of primary and secondary liability,
or ... concepts of active and passive conduct").
The courts themselves were sometimes victims of their own vagueness. At one point, for
example, a court became so frustrated after reviewing the various inconsistent standards uti-
lized in the equitable indemnity area that it rejected any notion of an objectively definable test.
It concluded that whether indemnity should be allowed depended upon the facts of each case
and should be allowed where in "equity and good conscience" the burden of the judgment
should be shifted. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493
(1964).
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distinct and important ways. Total equitable indemnity seeks to transfer
the entire loss imposed upon one tortfeasor to another who in justice and
equity should bear the burden.54 Contribution distributes the loss
equally among all tortfeasors, each bearing his pro rata share. 55 Contri-
bution becomes an issue when one of the tortfeasors pays more than his
pro rata share for the injuries caused. He may then seek reimbursement
from the other tortfeasor(s) to the extent of his overpayment.5 6
In reaction to the harsh consequences of rules barring contribu-
tion,57 and to counteract the equally inequitable "all or nothing" applica-
tion of common law indemnity, American jurisdictions gradually
allowed contribution among tortfeasors by legislative action.58 Califor-
nia adopted statutory contribution laws in 195 g.59 Under this rule, a
tortfeasor paying an entire judgment could seek contribution from other
tortfeasors pro rata. This resulted in all defendants sharing equally in the
payment of the judgment. However, this right existed only if certain
statutory conditions were met, including the requirement that a joint
judgment be rendered before the court recognized a right to contribu-
tion.60 The California contribution statutes, however, expressly recog-
nized the existence of the right of indemnity61 and did not supplant the
54. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equitable indem-
nity doctrine.
55. The right to contribution presupposes that joint tortfeasors are in pari delicto or
equally at fault. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964).
56. California's contribution statutes are encompassed in Civil Procedure Code §§ 875-880
and provide, in part, that where a money judgment has been rendered against multiple defend-
ants in a tort action, a tortfeasor can obtain contribution from his co-defendants if he has
discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share. The amount for which
he is entitled to be reimbursed is limited to the excess he paid over his pro rata share. In the
event he is entitled to equitable indemnity from another tortfeasor, contribution principles do
not apply and he is entitled to indemnity. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(f) (West 1980). The
pro rata share of each tortfeasor is determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among
all of them. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876 (West 1980).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28 for a discussion of the "no contribution"
rules.
58. See Comment, supra note 27, at 499.
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); see supra note 56 for a
summary of the contribution statutes.
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West 1980).
The common law rule prohibiting a defendant from impleading a party for contribution
was still viable. In order to implead a co-tortfeasor whom the plaintiff chose not to enjoin, a
defendant in California had to fashion his cross-claim in terms of indemnity rather than contri-
bution. Thus, the contribution remedies remained restricted, e.g., without a joint judgment a
payor could not enforce contribution either on appeal or in a subsequent action against his co-
tortfeasors. See Comment, supra note 27, at 503-04.
61. The statute provides that the contribution statutes "[s]hall not impair any right of
indemnity under existing law, and where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indem-
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indemnity doctrine. Accordingly, where a tortfeasor could show that he
was entitled to total indemnification, the contribution laws did not apply,
and the entire burden for the damages was shifted to the indemnifying
tortfeasor. 2
D. Comparative Negligence, Partial Indemnity and
Joint and Several Liability
In 1975, the California Supreme Court adopted a system of compar-
ative negligence in order to equitably apportion loss among the plaintiff
and tortfeasors according to their allocated fault.63 Soon thereafter, in
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,4 the California
Supreme Court extended the doctrine of comparative negligence to joint
tortfeasors. The court reaffirmed the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity among joint and concurrent tortfeasors"5 which had the effect of hav-
ing each tortfeasor contribute to a damage award an amount coinciding
with the percentage of fault allocated to each of them. 6 The court also
adopted the doctrine of comparative partial indemnity. This decision
profoundly affected the equitable indemnity doctrine. The decision did
not reject total equitable indemnity, as some courts have claimed.
Rather, it introduced partial equitable indemnity as a more equitable
doctrine in situations where a shift of 100% of the loss from one
tortfeasor to another would be patently unfair.
nity from another there shall be no right of contribution between them." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 875(f) (West 1980).
62. The doctrines of implied contractual indemnity and implied non-contractual indem-
nity developed in California simultaneously with the contribution statutes. See San Francisco
Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App, 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785
(1958) (implied contractual indemnity); City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330
P.2d 802 (1958) (implied noncontractual indemnity).
63. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (com-
parative negligence introduced into California tort law).
64. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
65. The doctrine of joint and several liability provides that each defendant is separately
liable for the entire judgment and all defendants collectively are liable for the entire judgment,
The doctrine embodies the common law principle that each tortfeasor is personally liable for
any indivisible injury of which his negligence is a proximate cause regardless of what other
parties or forces may also have contributed to the injury. Id. at 586-87, 578 P.2d at 904, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 187. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the recent enactment of Proposition 51
and its effect on the doctrine of joint and several liability.
66. Under the contribution statutes, defendants A and B would each pay 50% of a judg-
ment regardless of the extent each was at fault. However, under principles ofjoint and several
liability, ifA was adjudicated 20% at fault and B was adjudicated 80% negligent, A and B
would be responsible for 20% and 80% of the damages awarded, respectively. However, ifA
were judgment proof, B would have to pay the deficiency, for a total of 100% of the judgment.
See supra note 8 for a discussion of the effect the recent enactment of Proposition 51 has on
joint and several liability.
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In American Motorcycle, a teenage boy sought to recover damages
for injuries he incurred while participating in a cross-country motorcycle
race. The organizations sponsoring the race and collecting the entry fees
were named as defendants. One of the defendants, American Motorcycle
Association (AMA), sought to implead the plaintiff's parents by way of a
cross-complaint. AMA claimed that it was entitled to total indemnity
from the parents, alleging that its negligence was passive and that the
parents' negligence was active.6 7 AMA also asked for a declaration of
the allocable negligence of the victim's parents so that damages awarded
against AMA could be reduced accordingly. AMA based its request on
the assumption that Li v. Yellow Cab Co.68 abrogated joint and several
liability and established in its stead a rule whereby each tortfeasor who
proximately caused an indivisible harm may be held liable only for a
portion of plaintiff's recovery, determined on a comparative fault basis.69
In rejecting this argument, the court held that each tortfeasor was
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's total recovery; 70 however, as
to each other, they were entitled to seek partial indemnity on a compara-
tive fault basis.71 The court concluded that the all-or-nothing nature of
the total indemnity doctrine precluded courts from reaching an equitable
and just resolution in the majority of cases. Equity and fairness called
for an apportionment of loss between the tortfeasors in proportion to
their relative culpability, rather than shifting the entire loss upon one or
the other tortfeasor. 72 Thus, AMA could not seek total indemnity, but it
could pursue partial indemnification from the plaintiff's parents, whether
or not they were named as defendants in the original complaint.73
The court further concluded that California's contribution statutes
did not preclude the judicial extension of the statutory apportionment
concept through the adoption of a common law partial indemnification
doctrine. 74 In fact, the court noted that the California contribution stat-
utes specifically preserved the right of indemnity.75 The court concluded
67. AMA's cross-complaint alleged that the plaintiff's parents negligently failed to exer-
cise proper supervision over their minor child.
68. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
69. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 585-86, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
70. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
71. Id. at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
72. Id. at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
73. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
74. Id. at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
75. See supra note 61. At the time the contribution statutes were enacted, California case
law had clearly established that "a right of indemnification may arise as a result of contract or
equitable considerations." Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting Peters v. City of San Fran-
cisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 431, 260 P.2d 55, 62 (1953)).
114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:99
that equitable considerations justified modification of the equitable in-
demnity rules to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indem-
nity from other concurrent tortfeasors in proportion to their comparative
fault.76
E. Good Faith Settlements as a Bar to Partial Indemnity
Civil Procedure Code section 877, a provision in the statutory con-
tribution scheme, provides that a tortfeasor entering a good faith settle-
ment with the plaintiff is discharged from any liability for contribution to
any other tortfeasor. 7 The California Supreme Court in American Mo-
torcycle, extended section 877 to insulate a settling tortfeasor from any
claims by concurrent tortfeasors for partial or comparative indemnity.
7 8
The court stated that such a rule was necessary in order to promote the
important policy goal of encouraging settlements by ensuring their
finality.79
In response to the court's ruling in American Motorcycle, the Cali-
fornia Legislature enacted Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 which sets
forth procedural guidelines for a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
a settlement."0 Additionally, it provides that once the good faith of a
settlement has been established, any nonsettling tortfeasors are barred
from asserting claims against the settling tortfeasor for "equitable com-
parative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on
comparative negligence or comparative fault."'"
However, settlements not meeting good faith standards do not
shield the settlor from claims for reimbursement. Neither the American
Motorcycle court nor the legislature set forth the elements of a good faith
settlement. Instead, lower courts were left to decide this issue. In early
cases, a minority of courts suggested that the proper test of good faith
focused primarily on whether the settlement figure reasonably reflected
the settling tortfeasor's range of potential liability. 2 A majority of the
76. Id. at 598, 604, 578 P.2d at 912, 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195, 199.
77. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980). Section 877 also provides that the
plaintiff's ultimate award against any other tortfeasor is diminished only by the actual amount
of the settlement rather than by the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share of the judgment. Id.
§ 877(a).
78. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
79. Id. at 604, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
80. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
81. Id. § 877.6(c).
82. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498
(1972). The "reasonable range" definition of good faith originated with this case within the
context of the contribution statutes. The River Garden Farms court stated: "Xpplied to strike
a balance between the dual statutory objectives [of encouraging settlements by insuring their
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courts, on the other hand, concluded that a good faith settlement is sim-
ply one which is free of tortious or collusive conduct between the plaintiff
and the settling tortfeasor s3 Under this more liberal test, a nonsettling
tortfeasor could show lack of good faith only by proving that the settling
parties engaged in tortious conduct towards him or her.84
Recently, the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates,8" rejected the tortious conduct test as the sole
determinant of whether a settlement was made in good faith. Instead,
the court embraced the reasonable range test. Under the supreme court's
definition of good faith, a settlement is valid if it is accomplished in light
of a determination of relative liabilities.86 The Tech-Bilt court set forth a
skeletal framework for determining good or bad faith, primarily depen-
dent upon factors showing that the settlement was within a reasonable
range of the tortfeasor's potential liability.87
Thus, the settling party remains liable for partial indemnity if the
challenger shows the pretrial settlement amount to be unreasonable in
light of various factors or if he shows tortious conduct on the part of the
finality and a fair allocation of liability], the good faith clause should not invalidate a settle-
ment within a reasonable range of the settlor's fair [proportional] share [of relative liability]."
Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506. See also Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38
Cal. 3d 488, 499-501, 698 P.2d 159, 166-68, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263-65 (1985) (settlement
should bear some relation to settling defendant's relative culpability); Torres v. Union Pac.
R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984) (settlement sum should not be grossly
disproportionate to the settling defendant's fair share of the damages); Roberts, The "Good
Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 841, 855-58
(1984).
83. See, e.g., Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr.
38, 44-45 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488,
500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985). The Dompeling court
stated that:
A settling defendant does not owe a legal duty to adverse parties, the nonsettling
defendants, to pay the plaintiff more so that the adverse parties may pay the plaintiff
less .... The settling parties owe the nonsettling defendants a legal duty to refrain
from tortious or other wrongful [e.g., collusive] conduct; absent conduct violative of
such duty, the settling parties may act to further their respective interests without
regard to the effect of their settlement upon other defendants.
Id. at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 864-67.
84. The inequities of the settlement, such as a tortfeasor settling just for costs, were irrele-
vant to the determination of good faith. Settlement was favored over equitable apportionment
of loss. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disap-
proved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159,
167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
85. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). There, the settling tortfeasor
settled for only a waiver of costs, which the court determined to be disproportionate to his
relative liability and therefore not in good faith.
86. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
87. Id. See infra note 220 for a list of factors suggested by the court.
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settling parties. The question remains whether a settlement can be chal-
lenged on grounds of unreasonableness by a vicariously liable defendant;
or, alternatively, whether the settlement, although determined to be in
good faith, is still subject to a challenge by a vicariously liable defendant
seeking total, not partial, indemnification.
III. Do PRETRIAL SETTLEMENTS PRECLUDE
TOTAL EQUITABLE INDEMNITY?
A justifiable basis for challenging a pretrial settlement should result
when a nonsettling joint tortfeasor claims total indemnification. If a
tortfeasor's liability to a plaintiff is completely vicarious or derivative,
under California's common law equitable indemnification doctrine, total
indemnity should shift the entire burden of payment back to the settling
tortfeasor.88
Decisions of the lower courts reflect opposing views regarding this
issue.89 The conflict centers around the question of whether total equita-
ble indemnity survives American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court9" and whether, under the good faith settlement statutes, pretrial
settlements preclude total equitable indemnity. The next two sections of
this Comment set forth the primary cases espousing the opposing views
regarding the effect of good faith settlements on total indemnity under
circumstances involving vicarious or derivative liability.
A. American Motorcycle Subsumed Total Equitable Indemnity
The case most often cited by courts in support of the proposition
that total equitable indemnity does not survive a pretrial settlement made
in food faith is City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co.9 In
Gemsch, the plaintiff slipped and fell on some debris left on a sidewalk
over which the City of Sacramento had an easement. She subsequently
sued the city and the private owners and tenants of the adjacent prop-
erty. The debris had fallen from trees over which the city asserted own-
ership. A city ordinance required the adjacent owners to keep the
sidewalk free from debris. With the exception of the city, all of the de-
88. See Simmons, The Effect of Comparative Fault on California Contribution/Indemnifl-
cation Rights and How to Employ and Avoid the New Tortious Quicksand, 19 SAN DiEco L.
REv. 773, 778 (1982).
89. See, e-g., Standard Pac. v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1986).
90. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
91. 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
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fendants entered a pretrial settlement with the plaintiff.92
The city cross-complained against all defendants for total indemnity
on the theory of implied contract, i.e., that the ordinance placed the re-
sponsibility for sidewalk maintenance completely on the settling defend-
ants.93 The city argued that Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 was not
a bar to cross-complaints for total indemnity. The appellate court, in
affirming the trial court's dismissal of the city's cross-complaint, stated
that an implied contract did not exist and that the city had breached its
duty to inspect and trim the trees. The court also held that this could not
be unilaterally shifted to private citizens through ordinances.94 Thus, the
court concluded that the city did not have a right to total indemnity. 95
The court based its conclusion on several grounds. First, it deter-
mined that the facts did not demonstrate that a contractual relationship
existed between the defendants, thus creating a right to total indemnity.96
Second, the city had a duty to inspect and maintain the trees from which
the debris fell. The city also had a duty to prevent a dangerous condition
of which it had notice. Employing the old terms of active versus passive
negligence and primary versus secondary negligence, the court concluded
that the city's conduct was primary, although arguably passive.97 The
city's passive conduct was its failure to inspect. Such a negligent omis-
sion translated into primary conduct because the city had a duty to in-
spect the sidewalk.
The court did determine, however, that such labels were unneces-
sary and rejected the active-passive and primary-secondary distinction
between the negligence or fault of the indemnitor and indemnitee. It
stated that although American Motorcycle "may not have completely
abolished implied equitable indemnity in its traditional sense ... it se-
verely modified ... the passive/active, primary/secondary approach[es]
... [which were] absorbed into the new comparative indemnity of [Amer-
ican Motorcycle]." 98 The court further stated that there was no evident
equitable reason to grant the city total indemnity because the city had a
separate but concurrent duty to trim or remove the trees and to prevent a
92. Id. at 871-72, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
93. Id. at 873, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
94. Id. at 875, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
95. Id. at 875-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
96. Id. at 875, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
97. Id. at 875-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The city argued that if total indemnity did not
stand on implied contract, it was justified under the city's alternative allegation-that its con-
duct was passive-secondary and not active-primary. Id. at 875-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
98. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The court referred to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 886B for examples of when total indemnity would lie. See supra note 31 for an excerpt
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 866B.
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dangerous condition of which it had notice.99
Finally, the court concluded that pertinent language in section 877
precluded recovery by the city. The court stated that the statute was not
exclusionary but encompassed all types of tortfeasors, whether joint or
concurrent, whether active or passive, whether primary or secondary.
Therefore, the conduct of the city was and should be measurable under
American Motorcycle and, as such, the pretrial settlement made in good
faith precluded the city from seeking indemnity." °°
In summary, the Gemsch court, while appearing to reject total in-
demnity, left open the possibility that under certain conditions (i.e.,
where the alleged indemnitee is without negligence or fault) indemnity
99. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
100. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
It is unclear in the Gemsch opinion whether the city argued that it was not a "true" joint
tortfeasor and therefore it fell outside the parameters of Civil Procedure Code § 877. Appar-
ently such an argument would have proven futile given the Gemsch court's expansive interpre-
tation of § 877 encompassing all categories of tortfeasors.
California Civil Procedure Code § 877 is entitled "Release of one or more joint torifeasors;
effect upon liability of others". It provides in pertinent part that where a good faith pretrial
settlement is given to "one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort... (b) it shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it was given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980) (emphasis
added).
California Civil Procedure Code § 877.6 is entitled "Determination of good faith of settle-
ment with one or more tortfeasors . . . ." It provides at subsection (c) that "[a] determination
by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any otherjoint tortfeasor from
any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault."
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
Courts have generally refused to give a narrow construction to the language in Civil Pro-
cedure Code §§ 877 and 877.6. The California Supreme Court looked at the language in § 877
and determined that the statute was meant to "eliminate the distinction between joint
tortfeasors and concurrent or successive tortfeasors... and to permit broad application of the
statute." Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 702 P.2d 601, 607-08, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1985). See infra note 164 for a discussion of the facts of the Mesler case.
The same expansive interpretation has been given to the term "joint tortfeasors" as used
in § 877.6. See Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 282, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1983). In Turcon, the nonsettling defendant (Turcon Construction) sought indem-
nity from the settling defendants and contended that it was not a joint tortfeasor because it did
not act in concert with the tortfeasors who caused the injury to the plaintiff. Turcon claimed it
was a concurrent or successive tortfeasor and as such it was not barred by § 877.6 from seeking
indemnity. Id. at 282, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The Turcon court stated that modem usage of
the term "joint tortfeasors" did not lend itself to such a narrow construction. Id. The court
recognized that Turcon's construction of the term "joint tortfeasor" is the historical definition
of that term, but careless usage over the years by lawyers and the judiciary expanded its
meaning to include concurrent and successive tortfeasors. Id. at 283, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
The court presumed that the Legislature at the time it drafted § 877.6 was aware of the mod-
em use of the term "joint tortfeasors" as embracing joint, concurrent and successive
tortfeasors. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 192-98 for a discussion of the Turcon case.
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might still be permitted." 1 Mysteriously, the Gemsch case has been in-
correctly cited as authority for the rule that all forms of indemnity are
barred by American Motorcycle and section 877.6.102
In Lopez v. Blecher,113 the court denied a claim for total indemnity
by a vicariously liable defendant, holding that total indemnity was sub-
sumed by American Motorcycle. There, defendant Blecher, while driving
an automobile, came upon an overturned van on the highway. The van
was driven by defendant Gonzales and registered to defendant Lopez.
Blecher's vehicle struck the van, and then struck the plaintiff, Joseph, a
"good samaritan" who had stopped to render assistance. 1" The plaintiff,
Joseph, sued Blecher and Lopez. Prior to trial, Blecher entered into a
good faith settlement with the plaintiff. Lopez cross-complained against
Blecher for indemnity stating that her liability was secondary in nature,
being imputed from the negligence of the van's driver.1 5 The court re-
jected this claim, holding that it was precluded by the good faith
settlement. 106
The court reasoned that to distinguish between parties primarily and
secondarily liable would thwart the legislative goal of encouraging final-
ity of settlements, thereby decreasing prolonged litigation. 10 7 However,
the court did not make clear whether Lopez sought partial or total in-
demnity. The court framed its conclusion in terms of partial or compara-
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
102. Such a conclusion was propounded by the court in Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983). There, the plaintiffs discovered concealed fire damage
after purchasing a house. They sued the sellers, the real estate broker, the agent and the
business entities that had been hired to repair and inspect the premises, including a pest con-
trol company and a contractor. Id. at 325-26, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Both the pest control
company and contractor made pretrial good faith settlements with the plaintiffs pursuant to
sections 877 and 877.6, and the nonsettling parties then cross-complained against the settling
parties for total indemnity. Id.
Relying on Gemsch, the court concluded that a good faith settlement barred all forms of
indemnity between co-tortfeasors. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83. In the court's view, under
American Motorcycle, the "older type" of equitable indemnity (active-passive) had been ab-
sorbed into the new comparative indemnity, leaving no equitable indemnity from a co-defend-
ant who had settled in good faith. Id.
103. 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983).
104. Id. at 737-38, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
105. Id. at 738, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 191. Lopez's liability was imputed by statute under Vehi-
cle Code §§ 17150-17159. Under those statutes, both the owner and permissive operator of a
vehicle are deemed joint tortfeasors and are jointly and severally liable for the same damages,
although the owner's liability is expressly limited in dollar amount. However, Vehicle Code
§ 17153 authorizes indemnification of the owner by the vehicle operator. CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 17150-17159 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986).
106. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 740, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
107. Id. at 740, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
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tive indemnity.108
It is also unclear whether the Lopez decision would have been differ-
ent had Lopez cross-complained against Gonzales, the driver of her vehi-
cle, who was apparently never sued. Blecher, the settling defendant
against whom Lopez cross-claimed for indemnity, was the driver of the
automobile which struck her overturned van. There was no legal or spe-
cial relationship between Blecher and Lopez which was recognized in
either decisional or statutory law.'0 9 Thus, Lopez's liability did not de-
rive from the settling defendant.' 10
Similarly, in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,"' the effect of a
pretrial settlement on claims for total indemnity was again considered.
In Torres, both defendants entered into separate pretrial settlement
agreements with the plaintiff, who was injured while using his employer's
jack to change a tire on his own car. The plaintiff sued his employer, and
the manufacturer and distributor of the jack, claiming that the jack was
defective. Each settling defendant challenged the good faith of the
other's settlement, and each sought equitable indemnity from the other.
The trial court determined that both settlements were made in good faith
and that actions for equitable indemnity by the defendants were therefore
barred.1
12
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Torres court pointed out
that there was convincing evidence that the manufacturer/distributor
was responsible for the jack's defective condition. Conversely, there was
substantial doubt that the employer had any liability for the defect, be-
cause he had only bought the jack and loaned it to the plaintiff. How-
ever, the employer was not entitled to indemnification from its co-
defendant, according to the court, because it was primarily liable to the
plaintiff under another cause of action-its wrongful refusal to rehire the
108. Id. at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
109. See supra notes 29, 31, 34 & 105 for examples of liability derived from a legal or special
relationship.
110. In a case involving a similar situation, Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd.,
139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983), an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a
nonsettling party's cross-complaint for total indemnity where the party cross-claimed against
someone with whom it did not possess a legal relationship. In Turcon, the plaintiff was injured
when the gas tank on his motorcycle exploded after it collided with an automobile. He sued
the automobile owner and the manufacturers of the motorcycle and gas tank. The manufac-
turers settled with the plaintiff and the vehicle owner cross-complained against the manufac-
turers for total indemnity. Id. at 282-83, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 581. However, the owner's liability
did not derive from the manufacturer's liability and thus total indemnity was precluded. Id. at
284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
111. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
112. Id. at 503, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
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plaintiff after the accident. Thus, the employer could not claim total
indemnity.' 
1 3
The above cases indicate that total indemnity has been subsumed by
American Motorcycle and section 877.6. However, those cases all involve
situations where the defendants who did not settle were either negligent
or cross-claimed against a party with whom no legal relationship could
be established. Although the claimants framed their claims in terms of
total indemnity, the courts generally concluded they were really seeking
partial indemnity by virtue of their comparative negligence or by virtue
of their non-derivative status with regard to the settling defendants from
whom they sought indemnification. 1 4  Because partial indemnity is
barred in the face of a good faith settlement, their cross-complaints were
dismissed. However, the courts included total indemnity in their discus-
sion of the effect of American Motorcycle and section 877.6, claiming that
it was subsumed.
A more recent appellate court opinion, Standard Pacific of San Di-
ego v. A. A. Baxter Corp.," 5 followed the Gemsch rationale. In Baxter,
various homeowners whose homes were damaged by the subsidence of
landfill sued the builders and the retailers of their homes, the contractors
who had done the grading and compacting of the soil, and the original
land owner. The contractors settled with the plaintiffs. The builders and
retailers who did not settle sued the settling defendants for partial indem-
nity, claiming that the settlements were not made in good faith because
the settlements were not reasonable given the potential exposure of the
settling defendants. One of the builders/retailers also alternatively cross-
complained against the settling co-tortfeasors for total indemnity based
on strict liability."
6
The Baxter court followed the reasonable range standard enunciated
in Tech-Bilt Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates. 7 The court, focusing
on the settling defendants' potential liability, found that the settlements
were too low and refused to certify them as good faith settlements." 8
Thus, the nonsettling defendants could seek partial indemnity. However,
113. Id. at 510-11, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
114. See eg., Turcon, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The situation in
Turcon was identical to that in Lopez. The Turcon court stated that because the party seeking
indemnity cross-claimed against a party with whom a legal relationship did not exist, the com-
plaint contained no allegations which could provide the basis for shifting total liability. Id.
115. 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986).
116. Id. at 581, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
117. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). See supra text accompanying
notes 85-87 for the holding in Tech-Bil.
118. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 585, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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the court refused the retailer's claim for total indemnity, stating that
comparative fault encompasses the concept of equitable allocation of
loss.1 19 Therefore, comparative fault subsumes total indemnity which is
nothing more than the equitable allocation of all of the loss to another
party.120 Comparative equitable indemnity includes the entire range of
possible apportionments, from no right to any indemnification to a right
to complete indemnification. Total indemnification is just one end of the
continuum of comparative equitable indemnification. 121
The Baxter court further stated that the Tech-Bilt good faith stan-
dard required the settlement amount be reasonable in light of the settling
tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. This procedure required ac-
counting for the comparative lack of fault of a vicariously liable defend-
ant. 122 Since Tech-Bilt did not require a precise proportionate allocation
of liability, the Baxter court concluded that a good faith settlement can
result in a factually innocent party assuming some degree of liability.
The court indicated that such an approach strikes a balance between the
competing policy goals of allocation of fault and the encouragement of
settlements. 123
B. Total Equitable Indemnity Survives American Motorcycle
Other courts have found that American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court 124 did not abrogate total indemnity in situations involv-
ing vicarious or derivative liability. Rather, the belief is that American
Motorcycle modified the equitable indemnity doctrine to permit partial
indemnification among tortfeasors where there was apportionable
fault. 125 This position is reflected in the recent case of Angelus Associates
Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products,126 where a victim of an explosion
brought a products liability action against a manufacturer and retailer.
The court held that, under Civil Procedure Code section 877.6127the non-
119. Id. at 587-88, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
120. Id. at 588-89, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
121. Id. at 587-88, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
122. Id. at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
123. Id. at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
124. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
125. Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr.
403 (1985); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984).
126. 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985).
127. Id. at 534, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. In Angelus, the victims were injured in a motor
home explosion caused by a propane gas leak in a defective heating unit. They sued the manu-
facturer of the motor home, the manufacturer of the heating unit, the supplier of the heating
unit and the retailer (Angelus). All defendants cross-complained against each other for im-
plied indemnity and contribution. Prior to trial the motor home manufacturer and supplier
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settling retailer was entitled to pursue a cross-complaint for total equita-
ble indemnity against the manufacturer despite the manufacturer's good
faith settlement with the plaintiff. According to the court, total indem-
nity based on common law equitable principles still exists in situations
where the indemnitee's liability is merely vicarious or derivative."' 8 The
court reasoned that American Motorcycle, and the subsequent section
877.6, only barred cross-complaints against a good faith settling
tortfeasor for partial indemnity based on comparative fault.'29 In
Angelus, the retailer was without comparative fault, and therefore did
not meet the court's definition of "wrongdoer." 3' The retailer's liability
stemmed solely from its relationship with the manufacturer in the con-
text of the manufacturing and marketing chain."' Thus, the court con-
cluded, "[a]s to the person or entity ultimately responsible for the
defective product, the retailer is neither a wrongdoer nor a tortfeasor.
And where there is no wrongdoing to apportion, the principles of com-
parative fault cannot apply." 132 The Angelus court based its holding pri-
marily on the strength of three cases.' 33 Two of the cases, Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart13a and E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington
Beach,'35 involved post-judgment, as opposed to post-settlement, actions
for indemnity. In Nest-Kart, the California Supreme Court deferred rul-
ing on whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in
a situation in which a tortfeasor's liability is solely derivative or vicari-
settled with the victims under Civil Procedure Code section 877.6. The victims proceeded to
trial against the manufacturer of the heating unit and the retailer. Judgment was for the de-
fendants and the plaintiffs appealed. This case involved a separate appeal by the retailer in
which it attacked the judgment in favor of the manufacturer on its cross-complaint for total
indemnity which the retailer claimed was not barred by Civil Procedure Code § 877.6. Id. at
534-35, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
128. Id. at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409. The court stated that the retailer was entitled to total
indemnity. Under the doctrine of strict products liability, all persons and entities in the manu-
facturing and marketing chain are liable to a plaintiff even if they are not responsible for a
defect proximately causing the loss. However, as between themselves, equitable principles re-
quire that those who are not at fault for the defect are entitled to indemnity from those who
are. Id. at 535, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
129. Id. at 536, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
130. Id. at 541, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed.
1979)). The court noted Black's Law Dictionary defines "tortfeasor" as a wrong-doer; one
who commits or is guilty of a tort. Id. at 541, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
131. Id. at 541, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (retailers are factually innocent of any wrongdoing,
but are held legally culpable).
132. Id. at 541-42, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
133. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1978); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984); E.L. White, Inc.
v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1982).
134. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
135. 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1982).
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ous. There, both Nest-Kart, the supplier of the grocery cart which alleg-
edly broke and injured a Safeway customer, and Safeway were sued by
the victim. The court found that Safeway had a duty to maintain the
carts. Thus, its liability arose out of its negligence and not out of its
standing as a vicariously or derivatively liable party. The court con-
cluded that the comparative fault doctrine should apply to apportion lia-
bility between Nest-Kart and Safeway. Safeway was adjudicated eighty
percent at fault for the accident and therefore should bear eighty percent
of the damages awarded the plaintiff.'36 The Angelus court also relied on
E.L. White, Inc. v. Huntington Beach 137 to support the premise that total
indemnity survived the comparative fault principles set forth in American
Motorcycle.138 In E.L. White, a judgment was rendered in a wrongful
death action against a construction company and the city. White, the
construction company, produced evidence that it was only vicariously
liable under the peculiar risk doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability
on the employer of an independent contractor for the independent con-
tractor's negligence. White's vicarious liability arose not only from the
negligence of one of its subcontractors, but also from that of the city.
The city had been monitoring the entire construction process. It had
personnel at the site and it was aware of the open trench into which the
victim fell. White, on the other hand, did not have any of its own person-
nel at the site.139 White sought total indemnity from the city after paying
its portion of the personal injury judgment.
The court found that while White's negligence was vicarious, the
city's was actual.1 4° It concluded that in appropriate cases "where one is
held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnifica-
tion, not contribution, principles apply to shift the entire liability to the
one who was negligent."''
The third case on which the Angelus court relied was Huizar v. Abex
136. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d at 332 n.5, 579 P.2d at 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555 n.5.
137. 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1982).
138. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
139. EL. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 375-76, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (quoting D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55
N.Y.2d 454, 462, 435 N.E.2d 366, 369, 450 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (1982)). Citing another New
York case, the E.L. White court stated that:
[t]o conclude otherwise would counter basic "principles of common law indemnifica-
tion between vicariously liable tortfeasors and tortfeasors guilty of the acts and omis-
sions causing the harm. In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact
share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to
those who are only vicariously liable ...."
Id. at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (quoting Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 566,
300 N.E.2d 403, 410, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31-32 (1973)).
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Corp.'4 2 In Huizar, the injured party sued the product manufacturer and
its distributor for hand injuries received from a defective punch press.
Both defendants entered into pretrial settlements with the plaintiff under
section 877.6. The manufacturer then cross-complained against the dis-
tributor for partial indemnification. The distributor cross-complained
against the manufacturer for total indemnification based on the distribu-
tor's status as a derivative tortfeasor. The trial court determined that the
settlements were in good faith and dismissed each party's cross-com-
plaint for indemnity. Both defendants appealed the dismissals. 143
The appellate court concurred in the dismissal of the manufacturer's
cross-complaint because the manufacturer did "not contend that its lia-
bility to plaintiff was premised solely upon any act or omission of [the
distributor]... ."144 Therefore, the manufacturer was seeking partial in-
demnity, which was precluded. However, because the distributor sought
total indemnification on the grounds that its liability was solely attributa-
ble to its status as a mere conduit in the marketing chain, the Huizar
court reversed the dismissal of the distributor's cross-complaint. 145 The
court stated that, absent statutory language to the contrary, the doctrine
of total equitable indemnity exists separate and distinct from that of com-
parative indemnity. 146 The court summarized that "justice demands to-
tal indemnity where the liability of a completely blameless party is
premised solely upon the tortious act or omission of another."
' 147
According to the Huizar court, if the legislature had intended sec-
tion 877.6 to bar total indemnity, it would have included specific lan-
guage in the statute to that effect. 148 Instead, the statute "presupposes a
situation involving a claim '. . . for equitable comparative contribution,
or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or
comparative fault.' ,149 The Huizar court also concluded that had the
supreme court intended to abolish the total indemnity doctrine, it could
have specifically done so in American Motorcycle. Instead, the American
Motorcycle court only modified the equitable indemnity doctrine to allow
a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity based on equitable
142. 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984).
143. Id. at 537-38, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
144. Id. at 540, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 540-42, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
146. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
147. Id. See also Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 537-38, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
148. Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
149. Id. at 541, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c)) (emphasis in
original).
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allocation of fault. 150
The Huizar court, while stating that it was not ruling on the merits
of the distributor's claims for total indemnity, held that the distributor
had a right to a trial on the merits of such claims. The court further held
that if the trier of fact were to find that the distributor was actively negli-
gent in any degree in contributing to the plaintiff's injuries, the principles
of comparative indemnity would apply, thus barring any claims for total
or partial indemnity. 5'
In summary, the Angelus court, citing the Nest-Kart case, concluded
that the issue of the survival of total equitable indemnity had not been
determined in American Motorcycle,'52 and that total equitable indem-
nity survives a judgment where the indemnitee's liability is derivative.
The Angelus court took the E.L. White court's position one step further
and stated that the underlying equitable considerations did not change
simply because the indemnity action was brought post-settlement and
not post-judgment.' 53 Therefore, the Angelus court agreed with the
Huizar holding that American Motorcycle only modified the all-or-noth-
ing equitable indemnity doctrine to allow partial indemnity, instead of
total indemnity, in cases where the fault is apportioned among the
parties.
According to the Angelus court, the comparative indemnity doctrine
evolved to supplement the total indemnity doctrine in order to avoid in-
justice. Therefore, a negligent tortfeasor could no longer hide behind the
all-or-nothing shield of total indemnity, but would have to share in the
damages according to his degree of fault. Alternatively, the court sug-
gested that total indemnity remained available to a faultless tortfeasor
either post-settlement or post-judgment.
C. Analysis
Two competing policy goals underlie the entire issue of good faith
settlements and their effect upon indemnity. One is the policy of encour-
aging settlements by guaranteeing their finality and the other is the policy
of equitable apportionment of loss according to proportion of fault.1
5 4
The court in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court "I fur-
150. Id. at 541-42, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
151. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
152. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
153. Id. at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
154. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 997, 103 Cal. Rptr.
498, 506 (1972). See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 883, 891 & 895.
155. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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thered the policy of equitable apportionment of loss by introducing par-
tial equitable indemnity among tortfeasors. By advocating the
indestructability of good faith settlements, the court also promoted the
policy of encouraging settlements by guaranteeing their finality.
The incongruous nature of these goals becomes clear when applied
to the nonsettling tortfeasor who is without fault yet is denied indemnifi-
cation by the culpable settling tortfeasor. While settlements are en-
couraged because of their finality, the policy of equitable apportionment
of loss is nevertheless dealt a destructive blow. For where there is a fault-
less party, there is no wrongdoing to apportion. 56 Allowing a culpable
tortfeasor to escape full liability through a settlement with the plaintiff
produces an unjust result-the faultless party is faced with a judgment to
satisfy and no remedy against the party at fault.
The American Motorcycle decision supplanted the all-or-nothing to-
tal equitable indemnity doctrine in the case of tortfeasors who bore some
degree of fault. However, it is doubtful that the American Motorcycle
court meant to substitute an equally unjust policy of denying equity to an
innocent party simply because the culpable party has settled.
1. Survival of the total equitable indemnity doctrine
Contrary to the reasoning exemplified in City of Sacramento v.
Gemsch Investment Co.,"' American Motorcycle did not reject total in-
demnity in cases where there is only vicarious or derivative liability.
In American Motorcycle, the court briefly surveyed the development
of the equitable indemnity doctrine as an "all-or-nothing" proposition.
This inequitable result often shifted the entire burden of liability from the
less negligent tortfeasor to the one who was more culpable, even when
their relative culpability was almost equal.1 58 By applying the principles
156. Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 541-42,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1985).
157. 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes
90-100 for a discussion of the facts and reasoning of the court.
158. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 594, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192. The
court discussed Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal. Rptr.
702 (1971) as an example of the inequitable workings of the total indemnity doctrine. American
Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 595-97, 578 P.2d at 910-11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94. In Poeschl,
Ford sent a recall notice to its dealers requesting the recall of designated automobiles for serv-
icing of the cars' rear brake lights. A dealer and leasing agency failed to recall one such car
which had been leased to a customer and shortly thereafter the defect in the rear brake light
caused an accident. The victim sued Ford, the dealer and the leasing agency. Ford settled
with the plaintiff and subsequently sought indemnity from the dealer and leasing agency. Poes-
chl, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 696, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
Analyzing Ford's claim in terms of the elusive "active-passive" and "primary-secondary"
standards utilized by prior decisions, the Poeschl court determined that Ford was not entitled
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of comparative negligence to indemnity and introducing the concept of
partial indemnity among tortfeasors who shared in fault, the American
Motorcycle court attempted to curtail this inequitable result.
Although the American Motorcycle decision favored partial indem-
nity in situations of shared fault, the court never specifically addressed
the issue of total indemnity when liability is premised on some legal rela-
tion between the parties or arises from a rule of common or statutory
law. Instead, the court recognized that there remained situations where
a total shifting of liability would be appropriate. 159 However, it did not
specifically explain when full indemnification would apply, probably be-
cause the dispute in the case involved the right of a culpable party to seek
indemnity from another potentially culpable party. 6 The dispute did
not involve a vicariously or derivatively liable tortfeasor.
Subsequent opinions from the California Supreme Court imply that
to obtain total indemnification. Id. at 698-99, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 705. The Poeschl court
reasoned:
Ford's production of the defective car, coupled with its failure to attempt direct no-
tice to the customer, breached a direct obligation it owed to the latter. Ford had a
"last clear chance" to avert injury and failed to use it. Its fault is primary, not secon-
dary, and not imputed to it as a consequence of the dealer's or leasing agency's fault.
Under the pleaded circumstances, the latter are not liable for indemnification of the
manufacturer.
Id. at 699, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
The Poeschl court revealed its misgivings with the existing total indemnity doctrine which
sanctioned the inequitable result of permitting the dealer and leasing agency to escape all liabil-
ity whatsoever. The court reasoned that the dealer and leasing agency shared Ford's duty to
reach the customer before an accident occurred. If the dealer and leasing agency knew of the
danger and yet did nothing, they should not escape financial responsibility. However, to shift
the entire loss to them would result in Ford's escaping all financial liability. The court sug-
gested that a wiser rule of law would require both parties to share the loss. A rule of contribu-
tion or partial indemnity would permit that result. Id.
159. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 597, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (citing
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386
(1972)).
One of the New York cases upon which the California Supreme Court relied in modifying
the equitable indemnity doctrine was quoted as stating "'[there are situations when the facts
would in fairness warrant what [the named defendant] here seeks-passing on to [a concurrent
tortfeasor] all responsibility that may be imposed on [the named defendant] for negligence, a
traditional full indemnification.'" Id. (quoting Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147,
282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972)).
160. In American Motorcycle, the minor plaintiff sued the promoters of a motorcycle race
for injuries sustained during the race. The defendant motorcycle association (promoter) cross-
claimed against the minor's parents, alleging that they had been actively negligent in allowing
their son to enter the race. Id. at 584-85, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86. The court
held that the promoter had a right to seek partial indemnity on a comparative negligence basis
and could seek partial indemnity from a tortfeasor not named as a co-defendant by the plain-
tiff. Id. at 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
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American Motorcycle did not abolish total equitable indemnity. 16' For
example, the court in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart 162 acknowledged
the ambiguity but declined to consider the question because derivative or
vicarious liability was not an issue in the case.
163
In the more recent case of Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.,"64 the
court recognized that the contribution statutes preserve the right of total
indemnity and permit a vicariously liable judgment debtor to seek full
indemnity from the primary tortfeasor. 165 In the context of a good faith
settlement, the supreme court stated in Mesler that it had not yet ad-
dressed the question of whether a vicariously or derivatively liable judg-
ment debtor has a right to obtain indemnification from a primary
tortfeasor who has settled with a plaintiff. The court stated that "to the
extent such a right exists, '[i]n light of the clear legislative expression,...
we must assume that this contingency was foreseen, and that this result
was felt desirable.' ,166
161. See Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 305, 702 P.2d 601, 609-10, 216
Cal. Rptr. 443, 451-52 (1985); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 332 n.5, 579
P.2d 441, 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 n.5 (1978).
162. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978). See supra text accompanying
note 136 for a discussion of the case.
163. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d at 332 n.5, 579 P.2d at 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555 n.5.
164. 39 Cal. 3d 290, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985). In Mesler, an employee
sustained injuries while operating a bulldozer. He sued his employer and the bulldozer's previ-
ous owner, both wholly owned subsidiaries of a third corporation, Bragg Management Com-
pany. The plaintiff settled with the previous owner, a subsidiary of Bragg. Bragg contended
that the release of the subsidiary, its alter ego, also released Bragg. Id. at 295-96, 702 P.2d at
603, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45. The court disagreed and ruled that a plaintiff in a tort action
may sue one party as the alter ego of another, and that the alter ego is not released by a
settlement and release of the claim against the other party. Id. at 306, 702 P.2d at 610, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 452. The court reasoned that Civil Procedure Code § 877, which provides that a
release of one tortfeasor does not release any other tortfeasor, applied to all tortfeasors, includ-
ing parties alleged to be vicariously liable. Id. at 303, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
The court stated that the goal of maximization of plaintiff's recovery and equity among de-
fendants is best served by such a policy. Id. at 305, 702 P.2d at 609, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
However, regarding the competing goal of early and final settlement of claims, a problem
could arise in vicarious liability situations because the contribution statutes (specifically Civil
Procedure Code § 875(f)) preserve the right of full indemnity. Thus, it appeared to the court
that total indemnity was available to a defendant sued under a theory of vicarious liability. Id.
at 305, 702 P.2d at 609, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 452. However, the court did not address this poten-
tial problem in Mesler because the parent company was not seeking total indemnity from its
subsidiary. It is significant that the court acknowledged the existence of total indemnity and
the potential for problems under the circumstances of a pretrial settlement where there is a
nonsettling tortfeasor who is only vicariously liable.
165. Id. at 305, 702 P.2d at 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
166. Id. (quoting Ritter v. Technicolor Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686,
687 (1972)). In Ritter, the plaintiff settled with co-defendants who were agents of the nonset-
tling defendant. The settlement agreement between the agents and the plaintiff did not serve to
release the principal. The court stated that in light of the clear legislative intent in the contri-
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Such a position is in line with the appellate court's statements in
Huizar v. Abex Corp. 167 There, the court was of the opinion that, had the
legislature intended that a cause of action seeking total indemnification
be barred by a pretrial settlement under Civil Procedure Code section
877.6(c), the legislature could have included in the statute language to
that effect.168 Instead, the statute presumes a situation involving a claim
"'for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative in-
demnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.' "69 In
summary, the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing judicial de-
cisions. 70 The legislature was aware of the total indemnity doctrine as it
was applied in vicarious situations but did not make a provision to limit
that right. Thus, by codifying American Motorcycle's holding in Civil
Procedure Code section 877.6, the legislature did not supplant the right
to total indemnity. Instead, it merely modified the contribution statutes
to conform to the American Motorcycle decision permitting comparative
indemnity in situations where tortfeasors share in the culpability.
Additionally, the Huizar court stated that had the supreme court in
American Motorcycle desired to abolish the total indemnity doctrine, it
could have so stated. Instead, the American Motorcycle court explicitly
held that it was modjiying the all-or-nothing equitable indemnity doc-
trine to account for situations involving tortfeasors sharing in fault.1
7'
The doctrine of total indemnity was not supplanted and it exists separate
and distinct from that of comparative indemnity. 172 Likewise, the court
extended the new partial indemnity doctrine to good faith pretrial settle-
ments. Settling defendants are discharged from "any claim for partial or
comparative indemnity .... , The court did not include a statement
regarding total indemnity in situations warranting full indemnification.
It appears the American Motorcycle decision and section 877.6 do
not supplant total indemnity with a comparative indemnity doctrine. In-
bution statutes to preserve the right of indemnification, the principal could seek indemnity
from the settling agents if the principal were faced with a judgment. The court stated that by
retaining the right to equitable indemnity, the legislature must have foreseen that contingency
and deemed it desirable. Ritter, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
167. 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984).
168. Id. at 541, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
169. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1986)) (emphasis added
by court).
170. Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 303, 702 P.2d at 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
171. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
172. Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51. See also Angelus, 167 Cal. App.
3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
173. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (em-
phasis added).
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stead, they expand the equitable indemnity doctrine to allow partial in-
demnity based on the relative negligence of the parties. Since the
contribution statutes already contained a provision that parties settling in
good faith were immune from suits for contribution, the statute was judi-
cially expanded to bar suits by a comparatively negligent tortfeasor for
partial indemnity as well.174 In contrast, the cases holding that total in-
demnity no longer survives are distinguishable on their facts, and are
more properly viewed as having misconstrued the intent underlying
American Motorcycle and section 877.6.
2. Breach of a duty bars total indemnity
Courts asserting the premise that total indemnity was completely
subsumed into comparative indemnity under American Motorcycle most
often cite City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co. 175 as authority in
support of their proposition. The City of Sacramento, which sought in-
demnity from other tortfeasors who had settled with the plaintiff, at-
tempted to obtain total indemnification by drawing a distinction between
active and passive negligence. It argued that because of its passive role it
was entitled to full indemnity. 176 In rejecting this argument, the court
correctly observed that while American Motorcycle did not expressly re-
pudiate equitable indemnity under the old active-passive and primary-
secondary tests, it made clear that where a defendant shared in fault it
would not be able to take advantage of total indemnity. 177
The Gemsch court pointed out that the city had the primary duty to
inspect and maintain the trees and to prevent a dangerous condition on
its property. While the city's breach of this duty was a passive rather
than an affirmative act, the court concluded that "there is no reason to
make such distinctions [between active versus passive negligence].
Whatever the nature of the relative faults, whatever the quantum, it is
measurable under American Motorcycle." '78
Thus, where a tortfeasor has breached a duty, the Gemsch court
stated that there will be no analysis considering degrees of fault or of the
character or kind of wrong attributed to the tortfeasor under the old
174. See supra text accompanying notes 64-79 for the American Motorcycle court's holding
and its rationale.
175. 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
176. Id. at 875-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The city also argued an alternative theory of
implied contract which would allow the city indemnity against the private property owners.
The court dismissed this theory on the grounds that such an implied contract did not exist. Id.
at 875, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
177. Id. at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
178. Id.
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active-passive and primary-secondary standards. A negligent defendant
can no longer shift his loss to a more culpable party under the standards
of American Motorcycle."7 9 By couching its reasoning in terms of the
city's negligence, and by acknowledging that traditional equitable indem-
nity was still viable,' 80 the Gemsch court implied that equitable principles
would allow total indemnity in certain situations not guided by contract
or statute.1 81  It can be concluded that the good faith settlement in
Gemsch precluded any kind of indemnification due to the city's share in
the fault and not because total equitable indemnity has been completely
subsumed by principles of partial indemnity articulated by the court in
American Motorcycle.'82 Thus, Gemsch would not appear to be control-
ling in the case of a factually innocent party who seeks total indemnity.
Similarly, in Kohn v. Superior Court,'8 3 the nonsettling defendants
who allegedly committed fraud in misrepresenting the value of a house,
sought indemnification. The settling defendants allegedly failed to prop-
erly repair or inspect the residence. The nonsettling defendants, sellers of
the house, argued that they were not seeking partial indemnity from the
settling defendants but rather sought the "older type" of total indemnity
based upon the distinction between active and passive negligence. Alter-
natively, they sought total indemnity based upon an implied contractual
condition that the settling defendants would perform in a workmanlike
manner. 1
8 4
The Kohn court, relying on Gemsch, disagreed with the nonsettling
defendants' claim that a good faith settlement by some of the co-
tortfeasors did not bar all forms of indemnity. The court concluded that
American Motorcycle merged the older type of equitable indemnity into
the new doctrine of comparative indemnity and made equitable indem-
nity unavailable from a co-defendant who has settled in good faith.' 85
179. Id. at 876-77, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
180. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
181. The Gemsch court stated that total indemnity remained viable only in claims with a
contractual or statutory basis.
182. Judge Paras dissented from the majority opinion in Gemsch, arguing that it incorrectly
concluded that American Motorcycle abrogated total indemnity in the case of a factually inno-
cent party. He stated that American Motorcycle simply modified the equitable indemnity doc-
trine to permit partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis, but he did not address the issue
of the city's breach of duty. Id. at 878-79, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 769 (Paras, J., dissenting).
183. 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 0983). See supra note 102 for a discussion of
the facts of the case.
184. Id. at 329, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83. The court dismissed the implied contract theory
because the sellers had not properly presented that issue to the trial court. Id. at 330, 191 Cal.
Rptr. at 83.
185. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (citing City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115
Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981)).
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However, the Kohn court failed to realize that the "older type" of equita-
ble indemnity on which the American Motorcycle court focused was the
active-passive theory of equitable indemnity as applied to tortfeasors
who, to some degree, each shared responsibility for the plaintiffs dam-
ages. As indicated above, Gemsch also involved defendants who were all
negligent to some degree.186
Therefore, Kohn is incorrect in its interpretation of American Motor-
cycle and Gemsch. Neither of those opinions discussed total indemnity in
terms of a party who was only vicariously or derivatively liable. Both
courts admitted that total indemnity still exists in appropriate cases.
187
Kohn more appropriately stands for the premise that the notions of fair-
ness enunciated in American Motorcycle and Gemsch require that a
tortfeasor who shares in fault is barred from seeking indemnity from set-
tling co-defendants. The parties seeking indemnity in Kohn appeared to
be culpable in failing to properly repair the house and in misrepresenting
the value of the house. Thus, the court's statement in Kohn that compar-
ative indemnity absorbed all forms of indemnity exceeded the parameters
of those earlier decisions.
There are other decisions in which courts have denied total indem-
nity to a nonsettling defendant.1 8' Although these courts couch their
186. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99 and 178.
187. See supra notes 98 and 159 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 for a discussion of the Torres case.
See also IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986). The issue
in IRM was whether a landlord (IRM), allegedly liable under theories of strict liability and
negligence for a tenant's injuries arising out of a fall through a defective glass shower door,
could claim partial or total indemnity from co-tortfeasors who entered into a pretrial settle-
ment agreement with the plaintiff tenant. IRM was not the original owner of the apartment
building when the shower door was installed. IRM was a subsequent purchaser and cross-
claimed for indemnity against the contractor who built the apartment complex, the manufac-
turer and the installer of the shower door. Id. at 100-01, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 440. IRM based its
cross-claim against the settling contractor and shower door installer upon four theories:
(1) comparative equitable contribution; (2) total equitable indemnity arising out of its "pas-
sive" negligence versus the "active" negligence of the settling tortfeasors; (3) total indemnity
based on cross-defendant's breach of express and implied warranties; and (4) total indemnity
"by operation of law." Id. at 100, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's determination that the settlement was made in
good faith and the dismissal of IRM's cross-complaint for indemnity. First, the settlement
barred any claim for equitable comparative contribution. Id. at 102, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Regarding the remaining theories presented by IRM, the court adhered to the reasoning in the
Gemsch line of cases. The court concluded that total equitable indemnity and its concomitant
active-passive analysis was no longer viable in light of American Motorcycle. Id. at 109, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 446. Further, the court found that IRM's allegations regarding contractual in-
demnity based on breach of express and implied warranties failed because there was no express
contract of warranty or express agreement regarding indemnity between the parties. Id. at
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reasoning in the language of American Motorcycle, the factual circum-
stances reveal tortfeasors who, by virtue of their own culpability, could
never hope to obtain either partial or total indemnity. It follows that
they were barred from seeking indemnification by virtue of their culpabil-
ity, not by virtue of their vicarious or derivative status. Thus, these cases
are not apposite regarding the subsumation of total indemnity by Ameri-
can Motorcycle and section 877.6.
3. Total indemnity denied when defendants cross-complained
against the wrong party
Still other decisions exist in which a co-defendant sought relief on a
theory of vicarious liability claiming that a legal or special relationship
such as respondeat superior existed between himself and the settling de-
fendant. While the courts in such cases denied the claims on the grounds
that total indemnity was no longer available, those cases can be analyzed
on the basis that the claimants cross-complained for indemnification
against the wrong parties.
For example, in Lopez v. Blecher, s9 the owner of one of two vehicles
involved in an accident did not seek indemnity from the driver of her
vehicle, the party with whom she had a legal relationship. Instead, she
sued the driver of the other vehicle, with whom no legal relationship
existed. 90 The Lopez court did not deal with the fact that, for indemnifi-
cation purposes, the owner had cross-complained against the wrong
party. Instead, it admitted that the owner's liability was statutorily vica-
rious, but did not state the source of that liability. The court concluded
109, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Nor could implied contractual indemnity be granted because, as a
form of equitable indemnity, it was abrogated by American Motorcycle. Id. at 109-10, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 447. Finally, IRM's cross-complaint also failed in its claim for indemnity "by opera-
tion of law" because IRM allegedly shared in the fault. Id. at 110-11, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 448,
In fact, IRM was held to be liable on theories of strict liability and negligence in the
underlying case of Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1985). There, the court found that IRM negligently failed to discover the defective glass
shower door under its duties to examine the condition of the property and to maintain the
rental property in a safe and habitable condition. Id. at 468, 698 P.2d at 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
222. Thus, IRM shared in the fault and its liability was thereby measureable under a compara-
tive negligence standard and not under a theory of vicarious or derivative liability.
189. 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes
103-10 for a discussion of the Lopez case.
190. Under California law, the permissive owner and driver of a vehicle are considered joint
tortfeasors. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 1971). Under the principles of joint and several
liability, as reinforced in American Motorcycle, they are jointly and severally liable for plain-
tiff's injuries. However, the owner's liability is limited in dollar amount and the owner has a
statutory right to total indemnity against the driver of the owner's car. CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 17151, 17153 (West 1971).
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that the policy of encouraging settlement would be damaged if a vicari-
ously liable defendant were to retain the right to claim partial indemnity
against a co-defendant who has made a good faith settlement.191 How-
ever, a vicariously liable defendant has a claim for total, not partial, in-
demnity. By the express terms of Civil Procedure Code section 877.6,
even a vicariously liable tortfeasor can not seek partial indemnity. But
why would such a defendant claim partial indemnity when he has a right
to total indemnity at common law or by statute? Thus, the Lopez case is
distinguishable on its facts and does not establish that total indemnity
was subsumed by American Motorcycle.
Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd.'92 can be distin-
guished for the same reason. There, the plaintiff was injured when the
gas tank on his motorcycle exploded in a collision with an automobile.
The automobile was driven by an employee of Turcon Construction.
Plaintiff sued the automobile owner and the manufacturers of the alleg-
edly defective motorcycle and gas tank. All parties settled separately
with the plaintiff. Subsequently, defendant Turcon Construction, the
owner of the automobile involved in the accident, sought indemnity not
from the driver of its vehicle but from the manufacturers of the motorcy-
cle and gas tank. In Turcon, as in Lopez, there was no special or legal
relationship between the potential indemnitor and potential
indemnitee.
193
The nonsettling defendant's cross-complaint was couched in terms
of active versus passive negligence. The court determined that Turcon
Construction affirmatively shared in the negligence vis-a-vis its employee
and was seeking partial indemnity, which was precluded because a good
faith settlement had been negotiated. 194 Concluding that the active-pas-
sive distinction no longer provided a basis for indemnity, the Turcon
court denied the request.' 95 The court did, however, suggest circum-
stances under which total indemnity might still be allowed. For exam-
ple, if a cross-complaint rested on a theory of contractual indemnity or
alleged that the cross-complainant's liability vis-a-vis the settling defend-
ant was one imposed as a matter of law, such indemnity might still ex-
ist.19 6 However, in Turcon, the court found that the cross-complaint did
191. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 739-40, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
192. 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983).
193. Id. at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
194. Id. at 283-84, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
195. Id. at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
196. Id. Thus, if Turcon's employee had been named as a defendant and had entered into a
pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, the court implied that a claim by Turcon for total indem-
nity against its employee might be more viable.
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not contain allegations sufficient to justify shifting total liability to the
settling defendant.197
These cases clearly indicate that liability which is predicated upon a
legal relationship between indemnitor and indemnitee is still viable as a
basis for allowing total indemnification. In fact, as suggested by one
court, a two-pronged test exists to determine whether a cross-complaint
for total indemnity survives a pre-trial settlement. First, "[t]he cross-
complainant's liability must be vicarious" and second, "the cross-com-
plainant must also have a special 'relationship' with the cross-defendant
which makes it equitable for the former to shift all liability to the lat-
ter." '198 In both Lopez and Turcon, the vicariously liable defendants
owned vehicles involved in accidents. Their liability did not arise from
negligence on their part; but rather liability was imposed by statute.1 99
However, the owners did not seek indemnity against the defendants with
whom a legally recognized special relationship existed. Thus, any obser-
vations made by the Lopez and Turcon courts concerning the demise of
total equitable indemnity are not applicable to a case involving vicarious
or derivative liability.
4. Total indemnity denied because it is part of
comparative fault analysis
The court in Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp.2"
denied total indemnity to a nonsettling vicariously liable tortfeasor.20 1 It
stated that although a vicariously liable tortfeasor is not a tortious
wrongdoer, its liability rests on public policy. Therefore, its liability is
subjected to a comparative negligence analysis and, as such, it must
come within the purview of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court2"2 and Civil Procedure Code section 877.6.203 Total indemnity is
"just one end of the spectrum of comparative equitable indemnifica-
tion.' ' 2° The Baxter court felt that under the reasonable range require-
ment of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,2 °0 the procedure
for determining whether a settlement is in good faith requires accounting
197. Id.
198. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (emphasis in original).
199. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 1971). See supra note 190 discussing this.
200. 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986).
201. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and the
court's reasoning.
202. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
203. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
204. Id. at 588-89, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
205. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
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for the comparative lack of fault of a vicariously liable defendant.20 6
The supreme court in Tech-Bilt did not specify what constituted a
reasonable range of proportionate liability in specific circumstances.
That determination was left to the lower courts on a case-by-case ba-
sis.20 7 The question that remains is what settlement amount would be
reasonable under the Baxter rationale in a case involving issues of vicari-
ous liability? Would a settlement by the negligent tortfeasor for fifty per-
cent of his projected proportionate share of liability be reasonable?
Would sixty percent or seventy percent be reasonable? Such allocation of
liability does not conform to the historical purpose of restitution and un-
just enrichment underlying equitable indemnity;20 8 nor can such an allo-
cation be deemed an equitable apportionment of loss. It may encourage
settlements by negligent defendants; however, under Tech-Bilt, the good
faith of settlements is subject to attack on grounds of unreasonableness
by both vicarious and non-vicarious tortfeasors. Thus, under the Baxter
approach, neither of the two competing policy goals of promoting settle-
ment and equitable allocation of loss are advanced, much less brought
into balance.
IV. PROPOSAL
Equitable indemnity is a common law doctrine which historically
has been adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. As such, its application has
often led to inconsistent results. The California Supreme Court's exten-
sion of the principles of comparative negligence to equitable indemnity in
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court209 took the uncer-
tainty out of the application of the equitable indemnity doctrine, modify-
ing it in terms of allocation of fault. In doing so, the policy goal of
equitable apportionment of loss was served. By barring co-defendants
from challenging the good faith of settlements, the American Motorcycle
court met the second goal of encouraging settlements by ensuring their
finality.
Unfortunately, drawn into the wake of this fundamental alteration
of the equitable indemnity doctrine was the concept of total indemnity
arising out of vicarious or derivative liability. In a situation where there
is no wrongdoing to ascribe to a party, the principles of comparative fault
206. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
207. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-501, 698 P.2d at 166-68, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
208. The historical purpose of equitable indemnity is restitution and the prevention of un-
just enrichment. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
209. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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simply cannot apply.2 ' A different standard must be utilized.
A challenge to a settlement by a defendant whose liability is solely
vicarious or derivative should be judicially recognized. Total indemnifi-
cation should be permitted when the following factors exist. First, the
party seeking total indemnity should be required to show that a special
or legal relationship existed with the acting defendants and that this rela-
tionship resulted in vicarious or derivative liability being imposed by stat-
utory or decisional law. Special relationships of this type would include,
among others, master/servant, principal/agent, manufacturer/retailer
and respondeat superior.
Second, there must be no participation or negligent omission on the
part of the party seeking total indemnity. For example, the owner of an
automobile involved in an accident must not have loaned his car to a
drunken driver whom the owner knew to be drunk and who subsequently
caused an accident. Where the special relationship is principal/agent, for
example, the principal must not have prior knowledge of the agent's tor-
tious acts because such prior knowledge would be tantamount to
participation.211
Similarly, in the area of products liability, a non-negligent retailer or
distributor who sells a defective product and is subsequently found liable
should be indemnified by the manufacturer in post-settlement situations.
The same principle should apply in a situation where the indemnitor is
the one who performed defective work on an owner's or lessee's property
and, as a result, all are liable to the injured plaintiff. If the owner/lessee
fails to discover the defect or dangerous conditions created by the indem-
nitor, then he or she should be totally indemnified, as long as there was
no notice of the defect or dangerous condition and no duty to discover
the defect or remedy the dangerous condition.
As long as a special or legal relationship exists between the indemni-
tor and the indemnitee and the indemnitee did not participate in the
fault, equity and fairness, the theoretical basis of partial and total indem-
nity, demand recognition of a total indemnity challenge to a pretrial
settlement.
210. Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 541-42,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1985).
211. Conversely, the agent should be entitled to indemnification if the agent acted pursuant
to the direction of the principal and reasonably believed the direction to be lawful. Also,
indemnity should result if the agent was induced to act by a principal's misrepresentation upon
which the agent reasonably relied.
[Vol. 20:99
November 1986] TOTAL EQUITABLE INDEMNITY
A. Total Indemnity Pierces Pretrial Settlements
Total indemnity survives pretrial settlements in some situations.
For example, a nonsettling tortfeasor can obtain indemnification from a
settling defendant where the latter was under a contractual obligation to
protect the nonsettling defendant against liability to a third person.212
The right of parties to contract and to reap the benefits of their contract
is thus preserved. Such indemnification would be partial or total, de-
pending upon the contract terms. Further, if a plaintiff and a defendant
have entered into a collusive settlement agreement, then the nonsettling
defendant can challenge the good faith of a settlement and seek partial or
total indemnity, depending upon whether the nonsettling defendant
shared in the fault or was faultless.213
An interesting twist has evolved enabling a settling defendant to seek
indemnity from a nonsettling defendant. Courts have recognized the
right of a settling tortfeasor less at fault or not at fault, to be indemnified
for any excess paid above the amount which represents his proportionate
share of liability. 214 This view is justified in light of the policy goal of
equitable distribution of loss according to relative fault.
However, as discussed previously in this Comment, the policy con-
siderations shift when a nonsettling tortfeasor attacks the good faith of a
pretrial settlement on grounds other than contract or tortious conduct,
such as total indemnity. To encourage settlements, Civil Procedure Code
section 877.6 guarantees that settling tortfeasors will be free from claims
for partial or comparative indemnity from their nonsettling co-defend-
212. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West 1974); C.L. Peck Contractors v. Superior Court, 159
Cal. App. 3d 828, 205 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1984) (express contract claims for total indemnity not
barred by CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.6); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984) (implied contract claims not barred by statute).
213. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981) (tortious
conduct test). Dompeling was disapproved by the California Supreme Court to the extent it
was inconsistent with Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7,
698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985). In Tech-Bilt, tortious conduct is
deemed no longer the only basis on which a settlement can be attacked. Now, a settlement can
also be attacked on the grounds of being outside the settling defendant's reasonable range of
potential liability. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
214. See Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1985) (tortfeasor
who had paid in settlement more than its adjudicated comparative share of fault entitled to
recover excess paid from nonsettling co-defendants); Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App.
3d 249, 210 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1985) (co-tortfeasor who entered into good faith settlement allowed
to pursue cause of action for indemnity against nonsettling co-tortfeasor); Burlington N. R.R.
v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disapproved on other
grounds, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159,
167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985) (railroad company which had entered into good
faith settlement with plaintiff allowed to seek indemnity from other tortfeasor to the extent the
railroad company was compelled to pay plaintiff).
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ants. Some courts have indicated that the primary legislative intent be-
hind this statute was to promote settlements by guaranteeing their
finality. 15 However, in light of the "reasonable range" test espoused in
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, 16 the policy considera-
tions of fair and equitable apportionment of loss and encouragement of
settlements must be given equal importance.2 i
B. Settlements Must Be Within a Reasonable Range of a Settling
Defendant's Liability
Proportionality of a settlement amount in relation to culpability has
recently become a significant factor in the determination of what consti-
tutes a good faith settlement and may profoundly affect the ability of a
vicariously liable defendant to successfully challenge the good faith of a
pretrial settlement. In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associ-
ates,218 defendant Woodward-Clyde settled with the plaintiff for a waiver
of costs. A nonsettling co-defendant, Tech-Bilt, challenged the pretrial
settlement and cross-complained for indemnity. The trial court found
the settlement to be in good faith and dismissed Tech-Bilt's cross-com-
plaint for indemnity.219 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
settlement did not conform to good faith standards within the meaning of
section 877.6 and thus did not immunize the settling defendant from lia-
bility to the other joint tortfeasors 2 °
Paying less in settlement than one would pay in a judgment encour-
ages settlement. However, the Tech-Bilt court clearly stated that the set-
tlement amount should bear some relation to the settling defendant's
215. See Roberts, supra note 82, at 884.
216. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). See infra note 220 and text
accompanying note 221 for a discussion of what constitutes "reasonable range."
217. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The court
stated that "the equitable policies expressed in American Motorcycle, and implicitly adopted by
the legislature, include both the encouragement of settlements and the equitable allocation of
costs among multiple tortfeasors. Those policies would be disserved by an approach which
emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other." Id. (relying on Roberts, supra note 82,
at 899L901).
218. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
219. Id. at 491-92, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
220. Id. at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The court concluded that while
bad faith is not established by showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical
proportionate or fair share, the amount of the settlement is not irrelevant in determining good
faith. It held that certain factors must be considered, including a rough approximation of the
plaintiff's total recovery and the settling defendant's proportionate liability, the amount paid
in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs and a recognition that a
settling defendant should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after
trial. Id. at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
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relative culpability when considered in light of the plaintiff's potential
recovery after a trial.221 Otherwise, the settlement is subject to attack on
the basis of bad faith because the settling party has bought his peace too
cheaply.
222
Since, under Tech-Bilt, a negligent party can obtain partial indem-
nity if the settling defendant has settled for an amount less than his rea-
sonable share of potential liability, it would appear that a faultless party
should be able to successfully challenge the good faith of a settlement on
the ground of total indemnity. Allowing total indemnity would not abro-
gate California's tort law or its underlying policy considerations.
As noted previously, there are two competing goals underlying the
issue of settlements. 223 First is the equitable allocation of loss among the
parties according to relative fault. Second is the encouragement of settle-
ments. Enveloping both of these policy considerations is the primary
policy of maximizing the plaintiff's recovery.224 Some courts concluded
that the goal of encouraging settlements was more important than the
goal of equitable allocation of loss. 22 5 Implementing this rationale, they
justified their rejection of a nonsettling tortfeasor's cross-claim against a
settling defendant for total or partial indemnity. This position is interest-
ing in light of the legislative intent underlying section 877.6, where it
appears an attempt was made to accommodate both goals.226
Whatever the ranking, permitting a vicariously liable tortfeasor to
pierce a pretrial settlement will not abrogate the goals of maximizing the
plaintiff's recovery, equitably apportioning liability or encouraging set-
tlements. First, total indemnity will not affect the maximization of a vic-
tim's recovery under California law. All concurrent tortfeasors are
221. Id. at 499-501, 698 P.2d at 166-68, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-65.
222. For example, assume defendant A who is solvent and 80% at fault for the plaintiff's
injuries, settles with the plaintiff for 20% of plaintiff's projected total recovery. That leaves
the nonsettling defendant B, who is only 20% at fault, shouldering 80% of the damages.
Under such a policy, pretrial settlements are indeed encouraged but it can hardly be said that
they are equitable. A faultless party presents an even more compelling situation.
223. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
224. The public policy considerations underlying multiparty tort litigation in decreasing
order of priority are: (1) the maximization of recovery to the injured party; (2) settlement of
the injured party's claim and (3) equitable apportionment of liability among concurrent
tortfeasors. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 496,
147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978).
225. Id. See also Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 447, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56
(1980). Cf. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr.
498 (1972) (placing equitable allocation of loss before encouragement of settlements).
226. See supra note 217 for the supreme court's understanding of legislative intent in this
area.
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jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's economic damages.227 In the
event a co-defendant is unable to pay his allocated share of a judgment,
the other co-defendants must pay for the defaulting party's share of the
economic damages as well as their own.228 However, Proposition 51 has
abrogated joint and several liability as to noneconomic damages in per-
sonal injury cases. 29 A plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages
will no longer be maximized in the event of a defaulting or insolvent
tortfeasor. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot recover the amount de-
faulted upon from any other tortfeasor under any scenario.
When a defendant seeks total indemnity from the settling defendant,
the issue is not how much the plaintiff is going to recover in economic
damages. The nonsettling defendant must pay the plaintiff the amount of
any judgment for economic damages.230 However, he would be entitled
227. The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, presented to California voters as "Proposition
51," defines economic damages as objectively verifiable losses including medical expenses, loss
of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repairs or replacement, costs of ob-
taining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss of business or employment
opportunities. 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (1986). See also supra note 8.
228. Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983)
(defendant hospital and remaining solvent doctor liable for shortfall caused by bankruptcy of
other defendant doctor in direct proportion to their respective degrees of culpability).
The general rule is stated in Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675
(1985). There, the court stated:
[t]he rule is that: (a) the solvent tortfeasors among themselves in an indemnity action
must share in direct proportion to their respective degree of fault the liability of their
judgment-proof coactors; and (b) this computation must be made as though the judg-
ment-proof tortfeasors had not been involved in the accident.
Id. at 1174, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (citing Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d
353, 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (1983); Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the Cali-
fornia Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle As-
sociation v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1491-94 (1979)).
The rule contemplates not only the shortfall created by an insolvent or defaulting
tortfeasor, but also a tortfeasor who made a good faith pretrial settlement with the plaintiff in
an amount that represents less than his actual proportionate or comparative share of liability.
Under Civil Procedure Code § 877.6, his good faith settlement renders him judgment-proof for
the shortfall. Thus, in Sagadin, a settling tortfeasor paid less overall than the nonsettling
defendants, even though more at fault. Sagadin, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1174, 221 Cal. Rptr. at
696.
229. The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 defines non-economic damages as subjective, non-
monetary losses including, but not limited to pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering,
emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation
and humiliation. 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (1986). See also supra note 8.
230. A release of one tortfeasor does not release any other tortfeasor, including one who is
vicariously liable. Such a result would be contrary to the contribution statutes which were
enacted to circumvent such an effect. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 303,
702 P.2d 601, 608, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1985) (release of a subsidiary corporation did
not effectuate a release of the vicariously liable parent corporation; holding extended to an
employer-employee situation where the release of an employee did not act as a release of the
employer). See supra note 164 for a discussion of the Mesler case.
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to reimbursement from the settling defendant. To the extent the indem-
nitor was unable to reimburse the indemnitee the indemnitee would have
to bear the burden, regardless of his status as a vicarious faultless party.
Thus the goal of maximization of plaintiff's recovery is preserved as to
economic damages.
Second, total indemnity will not have a chilling effect on pretrial
settlements. As one court noted, total indemnity will deter only those
settlements by defendants who are clearly at fault and who attempt to
buy peace too cheaply at the expense of a faultless co-defendant.231 In
fact, total indemnity encourages a vicariously liable defendant to settle
first because the defendant can then look to the one directly responsible
for reimbursement.232
It has also been observed that recognizing the continued viability of
total equitable indemnity will not foster uncertainty in settlements. The
allegations of the complaint and cross-complaint for indemnity and an
analysis of the facts of the particular action will permit the parties and
the courts to determine whether a party is seeking total indemnity or
partial indemnity.2 33 Courts are presently conducting such an analysis,
and are not allowing total indemnity when comparative fault is
evident.234
Third, the policy of equitable apportionment of loss will not be abro-
gated by permitting continuation of total indemnity. There is nothing
equitable about compelling a faultless party to bear any portion of the
231. Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542, 213
Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1985).
232. Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App. 3d 249, 255, 210 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1985).
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
233. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
234. See, eg., Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1983). The Turcon court determined that the cross-complaint for indemnity did not
rest on any contractual indemnity nor did it allege that its liability was imposed as a matter of
law because of its relationship with the other defendant. Id. at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The
court noted that the cross-complaint could only be read as seeking indemnity on the basis of
partial or comparative fault, which is precluded by Civil Procedure Code § 877.6. Id. See also
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 83 Cal. App. 3d 454, 147 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1978). In Sauer,
the court stated that liability was properly apportioned between New Hampshire and Sauer.
Because both defendants were liable for different torts against the same plaintiff, one could not
seek indemnity from the other. In indemnity situations, two parties concur in fact or in law in
one injury to a third party, and the question is who will pay the damages arising out of that
single injury. Here, although New Hampshire framed its complaint in terms of indemnity, the
case simply involved a cause of action against Sauer for negligence. Sauer, 83 Cal. App. 3d at
459-60, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 882. See also Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203
Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1983); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1981).
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damages when indemnity can be obtained from the party directly respon-
sible. Where there is no fault to apportion, the principles of comparative
negligence should be inapplicable.235 It is acknowledged that maximiza-
tion of the plaintiff's recovery is a superior goal to that of equitable ap-
portionment. 236 Thus, in the case of an insolvent judgment-debtor, for
example, a vicariously liable, but solvent co-defendant would bear the
liability. However, in cases where a settling defendant has the means to
pay, equity demands that the vicarious tortfeasor be reimbursed by the
party directly responsible, regardless of whether that party has settled
with the plaintiff.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lower courts in California are not certain about the status of
total equitable indemnity in the event of a pretrial settlement between the
plaintiff and the culpable tortfeasor. However, the California Supreme
Court has expressed concern over the matter and implied that total in-
demnity in such an instance has not been supplanted by American Mo-
torcycle Association v. Superior Court237 or Civil Procedure Code section
877.6.238 California tort law historically has evolved in a manner indicat-
ing that its ultimate destination is a just and equitable solution for all
parties in a multi-party tort action.239 Therefore, total indemnification
should be recognized as a viable doctrine not only in post-judgment situ-
ations and in cases where the settling party is entitled to total indemnity,
but it should also be recognized where the culpable party has entered
into a pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, leaving the faultless party to
pay a judgment. Settlements may be discouraged, but only in the limited
instance where a fully liable tortfeasor attempts to buy settlement too
cheaply. The policy of the maximization of the injured party's recovery
is not disturbed while the policy of equitable distribution of loss is ele-
vated to equal status.
Sandra C. Gordon
235. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 541-42, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
236. See supra note 224. However, in light of Proposition 51, it appears that the maximiza-
tion of a plaintiff's recovery of non-economic damages is now secondary to equitable appor-
tionment of loss among tortfeasors. See supra note 8 for an explanation of Proposition 51.
237. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
238. Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 305, 702 P.2d 601, 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr.
443, 451-52 (1985); Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 332 n.5, 579 P.2d 441, 446
n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 n.5 (1978).
239. See Roberts, supra note 82, at 936; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736,
575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978).
